13 #include "tree234.h"
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16 #include "sshgssc.h"
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27 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
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28 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
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29 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
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30 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
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31 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
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32 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
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33 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
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34 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
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35 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
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36 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
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37 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
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38 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
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39 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
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40 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
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41 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
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42 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
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43 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
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44 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
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45 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
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46 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
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47 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
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48 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
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49 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
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50 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
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51 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
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52 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
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53 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
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54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
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55 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
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56 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
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57 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
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58 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
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59 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
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60 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
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61 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
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62 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
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63 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
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64 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
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65 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
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66 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
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67 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
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69 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
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70 #define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
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71 #define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
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72 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
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73 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
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74 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
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76 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
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77 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
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78 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
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80 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
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81 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
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82 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
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83 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
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84 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
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85 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
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86 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
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87 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
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88 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
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89 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
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90 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
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91 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
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92 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
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93 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
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94 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
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95 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
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96 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
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97 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
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98 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
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99 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
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100 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
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101 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
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102 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
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103 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
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104 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
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105 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
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106 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
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107 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
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108 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
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109 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
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110 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
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111 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
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112 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
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113 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
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114 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
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115 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
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116 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
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117 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
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118 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
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119 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
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120 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
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121 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
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122 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
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123 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
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124 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
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127 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
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128 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
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132 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
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137 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
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138 SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
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139 SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
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140 SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
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141 SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
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144 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
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145 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
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146 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
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147 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
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148 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
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149 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
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150 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
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151 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
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152 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
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153 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
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154 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
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155 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
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156 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
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157 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
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158 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
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160 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
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162 "host not allowed to connect",
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164 "key exchange failed",
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165 "host authentication failed",
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167 "compression error",
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168 "service not available",
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169 "protocol version not supported",
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170 "host key not verifiable",
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173 "too many connections",
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174 "auth cancelled by user",
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175 "no more auth methods available",
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176 "illegal user name",
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179 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
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180 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
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181 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
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182 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
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184 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
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187 * Various remote-bug flags.
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189 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
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190 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
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191 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
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192 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
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193 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
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194 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
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195 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
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196 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
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197 #define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
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198 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE 512
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201 * Codes for terminal modes.
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202 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
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203 * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
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204 * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
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206 static const struct {
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207 const char* const mode;
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209 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
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210 } ssh_ttymodes[] = {
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211 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
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212 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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213 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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214 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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215 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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216 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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217 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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218 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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219 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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220 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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221 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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222 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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223 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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224 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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225 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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226 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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227 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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228 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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229 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
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230 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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231 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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232 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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233 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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234 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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235 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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236 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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237 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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238 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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239 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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240 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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241 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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242 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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243 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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244 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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245 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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246 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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247 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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248 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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249 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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250 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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251 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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252 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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253 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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254 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
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255 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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256 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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257 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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258 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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259 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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260 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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261 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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262 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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263 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
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264 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
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267 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
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268 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
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269 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
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270 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
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271 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
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272 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
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273 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
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275 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
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276 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
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281 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
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282 if (!next) ret = s[0];
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284 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
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288 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
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290 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
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291 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
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292 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
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293 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
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294 return 1; /* true */
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295 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
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296 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
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297 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
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298 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
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299 return 0; /* false */
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301 return (atoi(s) != 0);
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304 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
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305 #define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
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306 #define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
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307 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
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309 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
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310 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
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311 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
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312 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
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313 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
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314 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
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315 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
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316 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
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317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
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318 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
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319 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
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320 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
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321 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
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322 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
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323 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
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324 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
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325 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
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326 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
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327 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
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328 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
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329 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
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330 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
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331 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
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332 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
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333 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
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334 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
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335 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
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336 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
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337 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
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338 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
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339 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
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340 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
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341 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
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342 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
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343 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
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344 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
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345 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
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346 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
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347 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
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348 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
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349 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
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352 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
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354 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
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355 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
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356 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
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357 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
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358 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
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359 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
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360 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
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361 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
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362 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
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363 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
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364 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
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365 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
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366 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
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367 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
\r
368 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
\r
369 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
\r
370 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
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371 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
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372 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
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373 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
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374 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
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375 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
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376 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
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377 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
378 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
\r
379 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
\r
380 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
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381 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
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382 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
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383 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
\r
384 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
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385 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
\r
386 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
\r
387 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
\r
388 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
\r
389 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
\r
390 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
\r
391 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
\r
392 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
\r
393 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
\r
394 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
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395 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
\r
396 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
397 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
\r
398 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
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404 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
\r
406 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
\r
407 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
\r
408 * fields to the packet logging code. */
\r
409 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
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413 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
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414 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
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417 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
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419 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
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421 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
\r
422 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
\r
423 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
\r
424 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
\r
426 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
\r
428 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
\r
429 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
\r
430 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
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432 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
\r
433 #define crState(t) \
\r
435 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
\r
437 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
\r
438 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
\r
439 #define crReturn(z) \
\r
441 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
\r
443 #define crReturnV \
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445 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
\r
447 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
\r
448 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
\r
449 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
\r
450 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
\r
452 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
\r
455 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
\r
456 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
\r
457 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
\r
458 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
\r
459 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
\r
460 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
\r
461 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
\r
462 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
\r
463 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
\r
464 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
\r
465 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
\r
466 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
\r
467 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
\r
468 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
\r
469 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
\r
470 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
\r
471 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
\r
472 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
\r
473 struct Packet *pktin);
\r
474 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
\r
475 struct Packet *pktin);
\r
478 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
\r
479 * various different purposes:
\r
481 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
\r
482 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
\r
483 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
\r
484 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
\r
485 * happen very often.
\r
487 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
\r
488 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
\r
489 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
\r
490 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
\r
491 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
\r
492 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
\r
494 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
\r
497 * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
\r
498 * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
\r
500 * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
\r
501 * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
\r
502 * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
\r
503 * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
\r
506 * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
\r
507 * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
\r
508 * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
\r
511 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
\r
512 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
\r
513 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
\r
514 #define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
\r
515 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
\r
516 #define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
\r
518 /* Maximum length of passwords/passphrases (arbitrary) */
\r
519 #define SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 100
\r
521 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
\r
523 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
\r
524 &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
\r
526 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
\r
527 &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
\r
530 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
\r
534 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
\r
537 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
\r
538 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
\r
542 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
\r
546 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
\r
548 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
\r
549 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
\r
550 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
\r
552 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
\r
553 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
\r
554 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
\r
557 enum { /* channel types */
\r
562 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
\r
566 * little structure to keep track of outstanding WINDOW_ADJUSTs
\r
569 struct winadj *next;
\r
574 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
\r
576 struct ssh_channel {
\r
577 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
\r
578 unsigned remoteid, localid;
\r
580 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
\r
583 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
\r
585 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
\r
586 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
\r
587 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
\r
588 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
\r
590 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
\r
595 * This flag indicates that a close is pending on the outgoing
\r
596 * side of the channel: that is, wherever we're getting the data
\r
597 * for this channel has sent us some data followed by EOF. We
\r
598 * can't actually close the channel until we've finished sending
\r
599 * the data, so we set this flag instead to remind us to
\r
600 * initiate the closing process once our buffer is clear.
\r
605 * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
\r
608 int throttling_conn;
\r
610 struct ssh2_data_channel {
\r
611 bufchain outbuffer;
\r
612 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
\r
613 /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
\r
614 int locwindow, locmaxwin;
\r
616 * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
\r
617 * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
\r
618 * last data packet or window adjust ack.
\r
622 * These store the list of window adjusts that haven't
\r
625 struct winadj *winadj_head, *winadj_tail;
\r
626 enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
\r
630 struct ssh_agent_channel {
\r
631 unsigned char *message;
\r
632 unsigned char msglen[4];
\r
633 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
\r
635 struct ssh_x11_channel {
\r
638 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
\r
645 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
\r
646 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
\r
647 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
\r
649 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
\r
650 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
\r
651 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
\r
652 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
\r
653 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
\r
654 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
\r
655 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
\r
656 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
\r
657 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
\r
658 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
\r
659 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
\r
661 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
\r
662 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
\r
663 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
\r
664 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
\r
665 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
\r
666 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
\r
668 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
\r
669 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
\r
671 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
\r
673 struct ssh_rportfwd {
\r
674 unsigned sport, dport;
\r
677 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
\r
679 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
\r
680 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
\r
683 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
\r
684 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
\r
685 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
\r
686 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
\r
689 struct ssh_portfwd {
\r
690 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
\r
692 unsigned sport, dport;
\r
693 char *saddr, *daddr;
\r
694 char *sserv, *dserv;
\r
695 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
\r
699 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
\r
700 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
\r
701 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
\r
704 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
\r
705 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
\r
706 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
\r
707 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
\r
708 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
\r
709 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
\r
710 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
\r
711 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
\r
712 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
\r
715 * State associated with packet logging
\r
719 struct logblank_t *blanks;
\r
722 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
\r
723 struct Packet *pktin);
\r
724 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
\r
725 struct Packet *pktin);
\r
726 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
\r
727 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
\r
728 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
\r
729 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
\r
730 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
\r
731 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
\r
732 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
\r
733 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
\r
734 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
\r
735 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
\r
736 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
\r
737 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
\r
738 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
\r
739 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
\r
740 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
\r
741 struct Packet *pktin);
\r
743 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
\r
744 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
\r
745 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
\r
749 struct Packet *pktin;
\r
752 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
\r
753 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
\r
756 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
\r
757 struct Packet *pktin;
\r
760 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
\r
761 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
\r
763 struct queued_handler;
\r
764 struct queued_handler {
\r
766 chandler_fn_t handler;
\r
768 struct queued_handler *next;
\r
772 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
\r
773 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
\r
783 unsigned char session_key[32];
\r
784 int v1_compressing;
\r
785 int v1_remote_protoflags;
\r
786 int v1_local_protoflags;
\r
787 int agentfwd_enabled;
\r
788 int X11_fwd_enabled;
\r
790 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
\r
791 void *v1_cipher_ctx;
\r
793 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
\r
794 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
\r
795 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
\r
796 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
\r
797 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
\r
798 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
\r
799 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
\r
800 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
\r
801 unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
\r
802 int v2_session_id_len;
\r
808 int echoing, editing;
\r
812 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
\r
813 int term_width, term_height;
\r
815 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
\r
816 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
\r
817 int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
\r
819 int close_expected;
\r
822 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
\r
825 SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
\r
826 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
\r
827 SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
\r
832 int size_needed, eof_needed;
\r
834 struct Packet **queue;
\r
835 int queuelen, queuesize;
\r
837 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
\r
838 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
\r
841 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
\r
842 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
\r
843 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
\r
848 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
\r
853 struct X11Display *x11disp;
\r
856 int conn_throttle_count;
\r
857 int overall_bufsize;
\r
859 int v1_stdout_throttling;
\r
860 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
\r
862 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
\r
863 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
\r
864 int do_ssh_init_crstate;
\r
865 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
\r
866 int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
\r
867 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
\r
868 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
\r
869 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
\r
871 void *do_ssh_init_state;
\r
872 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
\r
873 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
\r
874 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
\r
876 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
\r
877 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
\r
879 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
\r
880 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
\r
882 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
\r
883 struct Packet *pkt);
\r
884 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
\r
887 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
\r
888 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
\r
889 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
\r
890 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
\r
895 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
\r
897 void *agent_response;
\r
898 int agent_response_len;
\r
902 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
\r
903 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
\r
904 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
\r
905 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
\r
906 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
\r
907 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
\r
911 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
\r
914 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
\r
915 * with at any time.
\r
917 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
\r
920 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
\r
921 * indications from a request.
\r
923 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
\r
926 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
\r
931 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
\r
932 * size-based rekeys.
\r
934 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
\r
935 unsigned long max_data_size;
\r
936 int kex_in_progress;
\r
937 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
\r
938 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
\r
941 * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
\r
943 char *fullhostname;
\r
947 * GSSAPI libraries for this session.
\r
949 struct ssh_gss_liblist *gsslibs;
\r
953 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
\r
955 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
\r
956 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
\r
962 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
\r
968 #define bombout(msg) \
\r
970 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
\r
971 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
\r
973 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
\r
977 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
\r
979 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
\r
981 if (ssh->cfg.logomitpass)
\r
982 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
\r
985 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
\r
987 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata)
\r
988 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
\r
991 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
\r
993 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
\r
996 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
\r
997 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh, char *modes,
\r
998 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
\r
1002 char *t = strchr(modes, '\t');
\r
1003 char *m = snewn(t-modes+1, char);
\r
1005 strncpy(m, modes, t-modes);
\r
1006 m[t-modes] = '\0';
\r
1007 if (*(t+1) == 'A')
\r
1008 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, m);
\r
1010 val = dupstr(t+2);
\r
1012 do_mode(data, m, val);
\r
1015 modes += strlen(modes) + 1;
\r
1019 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
\r
1021 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
\r
1022 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
\r
1023 if (a->localid < b->localid)
\r
1025 if (a->localid > b->localid)
\r
1029 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
\r
1031 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
\r
1032 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
\r
1033 if (*a < b->localid)
\r
1035 if (*a > b->localid)
\r
1040 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
\r
1042 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
\r
1043 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
\r
1045 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
\r
1046 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
\r
1047 if (a->dport > b->dport)
\r
1049 if (a->dport < b->dport)
\r
1054 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
\r
1056 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
\r
1057 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
\r
1059 if (a->sport > b->sport)
\r
1061 if (a->sport < b->sport)
\r
1067 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
\r
1068 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
\r
1070 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
\r
1072 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
\r
1078 return strcmp(a, b);
\r
1081 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
\r
1083 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
\r
1084 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
\r
1086 if (a->type > b->type)
\r
1088 if (a->type < b->type)
\r
1090 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
\r
1092 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
\r
1094 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
\r
1095 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
\r
1096 if (a->sport > b->sport)
\r
1098 if (a->sport < b->sport)
\r
1100 if (a->type != 'D') {
\r
1101 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
\r
1102 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
\r
1103 if (a->dport > b->dport)
\r
1105 if (a->dport < b->dport)
\r
1111 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
\r
1113 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
\r
1114 unsigned low, high, mid;
\r
1116 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
1119 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
\r
1120 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
\r
1121 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
\r
1122 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
\r
1123 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
\r
1124 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
\r
1126 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
\r
1130 while (high - low > 1) {
\r
1131 mid = (high + low) / 2;
\r
1132 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
\r
1133 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
\r
1134 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
\r
1136 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
\r
1139 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
\r
1140 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
\r
1143 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
\r
1144 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
\r
1146 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
\r
1149 static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
\r
1152 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
\r
1153 if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
\r
1154 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
\r
1157 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
\r
1159 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
\r
1160 c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
\r
1162 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
\r
1165 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
\r
1167 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
\r
1168 c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
\r
1170 from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
\r
1173 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
\r
1175 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
\r
1178 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
\r
1183 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
\r
1185 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
\r
1187 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
\r
1189 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
\r
1191 pkt->blanks = NULL;
\r
1197 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
\r
1198 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
\r
1199 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
\r
1200 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
\r
1201 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
\r
1203 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
\r
1205 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
\r
1207 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
\r
1209 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
\r
1211 st->pktin->type = 0;
\r
1212 st->pktin->length = 0;
\r
1214 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
\r
1215 while ((*datalen) == 0)
\r
1217 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
\r
1218 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
\r
1221 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
\r
1222 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
\r
1223 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
\r
1225 if (st->biglen < 0) {
\r
1226 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
\r
1227 " data stream corruption"));
\r
1228 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
\r
1232 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
\r
1233 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
\r
1235 st->to_read = st->biglen;
\r
1236 st->p = st->pktin->data;
\r
1237 while (st->to_read > 0) {
\r
1238 st->chunk = st->to_read;
\r
1239 while ((*datalen) == 0)
\r
1241 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
\r
1242 st->chunk = (*datalen);
\r
1243 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
\r
1244 *data += st->chunk;
\r
1245 *datalen -= st->chunk;
\r
1246 st->p += st->chunk;
\r
1247 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
\r
1250 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
\r
1251 st->biglen, NULL)) {
\r
1252 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
\r
1253 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
\r
1258 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
\r
1260 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
\r
1261 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
\r
1262 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
\r
1263 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
\r
1264 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
\r
1268 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
\r
1269 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
\r
1271 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
\r
1272 unsigned char *decompblk;
\r
1274 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
\r
1275 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
\r
1276 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
\r
1277 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
\r
1278 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
\r
1282 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
\r
1283 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
\r
1284 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
\r
1285 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
\r
1287 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
\r
1290 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
\r
1292 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
\r
1295 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
\r
1298 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
\r
1300 if (ssh->logctx) {
\r
1302 struct logblank_t blank;
\r
1303 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
\r
1304 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
\r
1305 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
\r
1306 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
\r
1307 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
\r
1308 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
\r
1309 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
\r
1310 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
\r
1313 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
\r
1314 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
\r
1315 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
\r
1319 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
\r
1320 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
\r
1321 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
\r
1322 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
\r
1323 nblanks, &blank, NULL);
\r
1326 crFinish(st->pktin);
\r
1329 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
\r
1331 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
\r
1333 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
\r
1335 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
\r
1337 st->pktin->type = 0;
\r
1338 st->pktin->length = 0;
\r
1339 if (ssh->sccipher)
\r
1340 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
\r
1342 st->cipherblk = 8;
\r
1343 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
\r
1344 st->cipherblk = 8;
\r
1345 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
\r
1347 if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
\r
1350 * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
\r
1351 * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
\r
1352 * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
\r
1353 * cipher more than once and thus leak information
\r
1354 * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
\r
1355 * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
\r
1356 * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
\r
1357 * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
\r
1358 * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
\r
1362 /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
\r
1363 st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
\r
1366 /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
\r
1367 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
\r
1368 while ((*datalen) == 0)
\r
1370 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
\r
1374 st->packetlen = 0;
\r
1376 unsigned char seq[4];
\r
1377 ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
\r
1378 PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
\r
1379 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
\r
1382 for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
\r
1383 /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
\r
1384 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
\r
1385 while ((*datalen) == 0)
\r
1387 st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
\r
1390 /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
\r
1391 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
\r
1392 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
\r
1394 /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
\r
1395 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
\r
1396 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
\r
1397 st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
\r
1398 /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
\r
1399 if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
\r
1400 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
\r
1401 (st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data)) + 4 == st->packetlen)
\r
1403 if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
\r
1404 bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
\r
1405 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
\r
1409 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
\r
1410 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
\r
1411 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
\r
1414 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
\r
1417 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
\r
1418 * contain the length and padding details.
\r
1420 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
\r
1421 while ((*datalen) == 0)
\r
1423 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
\r
1427 if (ssh->sccipher)
\r
1428 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
\r
1429 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
\r
1432 * Now get the length figure.
\r
1434 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
\r
1437 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
\r
1438 * do us any more damage.
\r
1440 if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
\r
1441 (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
\r
1442 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
\r
1443 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
\r
1448 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
\r
1450 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
\r
1453 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
\r
1455 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
\r
1456 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
\r
1457 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
\r
1461 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
\r
1463 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
\r
1465 while ((*datalen) == 0)
\r
1467 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
\r
1470 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
\r
1471 if (ssh->sccipher)
\r
1472 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
\r
1473 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
\r
1474 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
\r
1480 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
\r
1481 st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
\r
1482 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
\r
1483 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
\r
1487 /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
\r
1488 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
\r
1489 if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
\r
1490 bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
\r
1491 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
\r
1495 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
\r
1497 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
\r
1499 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
\r
1500 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
\r
1502 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
\r
1505 * Decompress packet payload.
\r
1508 unsigned char *newpayload;
\r
1510 if (ssh->sccomp &&
\r
1511 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
\r
1512 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
\r
1513 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
\r
1514 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
\r
1515 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
\r
1516 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
\r
1517 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
\r
1520 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
\r
1521 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
\r
1522 sfree(newpayload);
\r
1526 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
\r
1527 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
\r
1528 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
\r
1531 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
\r
1533 if (ssh->logctx) {
\r
1535 struct logblank_t blank;
\r
1536 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
\r
1537 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
\r
1538 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
\r
1539 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
\r
1540 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
\r
1541 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
\r
1542 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
\r
1545 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
\r
1546 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
\r
1547 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
\r
1551 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
\r
1552 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
\r
1554 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
\r
1555 nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
\r
1558 crFinish(st->pktin);
\r
1561 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
\r
1563 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
\r
1564 unsigned long crc;
\r
1567 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
\r
1568 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
\r
1569 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
\r
1570 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
\r
1577 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
\r
1578 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
\r
1579 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
\r
1580 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
\r
1581 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
\r
1584 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
\r
1585 unsigned char *compblk;
\r
1587 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
\r
1588 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
\r
1589 &compblk, &complen);
\r
1590 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
\r
1591 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
\r
1593 pkt->length = complen + 12;
\r
1596 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
\r
1598 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
\r
1599 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
\r
1600 pktoffs = 8 - pad;
\r
1601 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
\r
1603 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
\r
1604 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
\r
1605 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
\r
1606 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
\r
1607 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
\r
1610 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
\r
1611 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
\r
1613 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
\r
1614 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
\r
1617 static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
\r
1620 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
\r
1622 return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
\r
1625 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
\r
1627 int len, backlog, offset;
\r
1628 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
\r
1629 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
\r
1630 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
\r
1631 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
\r
1632 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
\r
1635 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
\r
1638 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
\r
1639 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
\r
1640 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
\r
1641 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
\r
1642 ssh->deferred_size,
\r
1645 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
\r
1646 pkt->data + offset, len);
\r
1647 ssh->deferred_len += len;
\r
1648 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
\r
1652 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
\r
1653 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
\r
1654 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
\r
1656 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
\r
1660 struct Packet *pkt;
\r
1662 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
\r
1664 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
\r
1665 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
\r
1667 unsigned long argint;
\r
1669 switch (argtype) {
\r
1670 /* Actual fields in the packet */
\r
1672 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
\r
1673 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
\r
1676 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
\r
1677 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
\r
1680 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
\r
1681 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
\r
1682 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
\r
1685 sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
\r
1686 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
\r
1689 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
\r
1690 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
\r
1692 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
\r
1693 case PKTT_PASSWORD:
\r
1694 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
\r
1697 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
\r
1700 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
\r
1708 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
\r
1710 struct Packet *pkt;
\r
1712 va_start(ap, pkttype);
\r
1713 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
\r
1715 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
\r
1718 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
\r
1720 struct Packet *pkt;
\r
1722 va_start(ap, pkttype);
\r
1723 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
\r
1725 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
\r
1728 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
\r
1731 unsigned long av, bv;
\r
1733 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
\r
1734 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
\r
1736 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
\r
1741 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
\r
1742 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
\r
1744 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
\r
1749 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
\r
1750 * `uint32' into a hash state.
\r
1752 static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
\r
1754 unsigned char lenblk[4];
\r
1755 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
\r
1756 h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
\r
1757 h->bytes(s, str, len);
\r
1760 static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
\r
1762 unsigned char intblk[4];
\r
1763 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
\r
1764 h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
\r
1768 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
\r
1770 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
\r
1772 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
\r
1773 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
\r
1774 int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
\r
1775 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
\r
1776 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
\r
1777 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
\r
1780 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
\r
1782 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
\r
1784 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
\r
1785 assert(pkt->body);
\r
1786 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
\r
1787 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
\r
1788 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
\r
1789 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
\r
1791 pkt->length += len;
\r
1792 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
\r
1793 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
\r
1795 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
\r
1797 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
\r
1799 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
\r
1801 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
\r
1803 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
\r
1805 unsigned char x[4];
\r
1806 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
\r
1807 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
\r
1809 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
\r
1811 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
\r
1812 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
\r
1814 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
\r
1816 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
\r
1817 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
\r
1819 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
\r
1821 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
\r
1822 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
\r
1824 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
\r
1826 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
\r
1827 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
\r
1829 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
\r
1831 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
\r
1832 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
\r
1833 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
\r
1834 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
\r
1837 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
\r
1840 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
\r
1841 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
\r
1843 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
\r
1844 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
\r
1846 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
\r
1848 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
\r
1852 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
\r
1856 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
\r
1857 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
\r
1858 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
\r
1862 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
\r
1864 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
\r
1865 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
\r
1866 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
\r
1867 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
\r
1871 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
\r
1872 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
\r
1873 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
\r
1874 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
\r
1875 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
\r
1876 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
\r
1877 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
\r
1878 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
\r
1879 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
\r
1881 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
\r
1883 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
\r
1884 pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
\r
1885 pkt->forcepad = 0;
\r
1886 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
\r
1887 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
\r
1892 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
\r
1893 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
\r
1894 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
\r
1896 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
\r
1898 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
\r
1901 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
\r
1902 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
\r
1903 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
\r
1904 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
\r
1905 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
\r
1909 * Compress packet payload.
\r
1912 unsigned char *newpayload;
\r
1914 if (ssh->cscomp &&
\r
1915 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
\r
1917 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
\r
1919 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
\r
1920 sfree(newpayload);
\r
1925 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
\r
1926 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
\r
1927 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
\r
1930 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
\r
1931 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
\r
1933 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
\r
1934 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
\r
1936 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
\r
1937 assert(padding <= 255);
\r
1938 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
\r
1939 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
\r
1940 pkt->data[4] = padding;
\r
1941 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
\r
1942 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
\r
1943 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
\r
1945 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
\r
1946 pkt->length + padding,
\r
1947 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
\r
1948 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
\r
1950 if (ssh->cscipher)
\r
1951 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
\r
1952 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
\r
1954 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
\r
1956 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
\r
1957 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
\r
1961 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
\r
1962 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
\r
1963 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
\r
1965 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
\r
1966 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
\r
1967 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
\r
1968 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
\r
1969 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
\r
1970 * works after packet encryption.
\r
1972 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
\r
1973 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
\r
1974 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
\r
1975 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
\r
1976 * then send them once we've finished.
\r
1978 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
\r
1979 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
\r
1981 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
\r
1982 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
\r
1983 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
\r
1984 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
\r
1985 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
\r
1986 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
\r
1988 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
\r
1989 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
\r
1990 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
\r
1991 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
\r
1992 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
\r
1993 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
\r
1997 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
\r
1998 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
\r
2001 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
\r
2003 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
\r
2007 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
\r
2008 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
\r
2009 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
\r
2010 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
\r
2013 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
\r
2014 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
\r
2015 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
\r
2016 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
\r
2018 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
\r
2019 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
\r
2020 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
\r
2021 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
\r
2022 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
\r
2024 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
\r
2028 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
\r
2030 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
\r
2033 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
\r
2034 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore &&
\r
2035 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
\r
2037 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
\r
2038 * get encrypted with a known IV.
\r
2040 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
\r
2041 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
\r
2042 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
\r
2044 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
\r
2045 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
\r
2046 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
\r
2047 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
\r
2048 ssh->deferred_size,
\r
2051 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
\r
2052 ssh->deferred_len += len;
\r
2053 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
\r
2054 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
\r
2058 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
\r
2060 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
\r
2062 assert(ssh->queueing);
\r
2064 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
\r
2065 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
\r
2066 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
\r
2069 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
\r
2073 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
\r
2076 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
\r
2078 if (ssh->queueing)
\r
2079 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
\r
2081 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
\r
2085 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
\r
2088 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
\r
2090 if (ssh->queueing)
\r
2091 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
\r
2093 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
\r
2097 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
\r
2098 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
\r
2100 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
\r
2101 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
\r
2102 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
\r
2103 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
\r
2104 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
\r
2105 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
\r
2106 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
\r
2109 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
\r
2112 backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
\r
2113 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
\r
2114 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
\r
2115 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
\r
2116 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
\r
2117 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
\r
2119 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
\r
2120 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
\r
2121 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
\r
2122 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
\r
2123 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
\r
2124 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
\r
2128 * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
\r
2129 * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
\r
2131 static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
\r
2137 * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
\r
2138 * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
\r
2140 * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
\r
2141 * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
\r
2144 pkt->forcepad = padsize;
\r
2145 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
\r
2150 * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
\r
2151 * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
\r
2152 * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
\r
2153 * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
\r
2154 * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
\r
2156 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
\r
2159 * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
\r
2160 * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
\r
2161 * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
\r
2162 * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
\r
2163 * gain nothing by it.)
\r
2165 if (ssh->cscipher &&
\r
2166 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
\r
2169 stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
\r
2170 stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
\r
2171 stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
\r
2172 if (ssh->cscomp) {
\r
2174 * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
\r
2175 * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
\r
2176 * length we want it. The compression-disabling
\r
2177 * routine should return an integer indicating how
\r
2178 * many bytes we should adjust our string length
\r
2182 ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
\r
2184 pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
\r
2185 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
\r
2186 for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
\r
2187 char c = (char) random_byte();
\r
2188 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
\r
2190 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
\r
2192 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
\r
2197 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
\r
2198 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
\r
2199 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
\r
2201 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
\r
2205 assert(!ssh->queueing);
\r
2207 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
\r
2208 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
\r
2209 ssh->queuelen = 0;
\r
2211 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
\r
2215 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
\r
2219 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
\r
2220 debug(("%s", string));
\r
2221 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
\r
2222 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
\r
2228 static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
\r
2232 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
\r
2233 hash_string(h, s, p, len);
\r
2238 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
\r
2240 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
\r
2242 unsigned long value;
\r
2243 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
\r
2244 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
\r
2245 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
\r
2246 pkt->savedpos += 4;
\r
2249 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
\r
2251 unsigned long value;
\r
2252 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
\r
2253 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
\r
2254 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
\r
2258 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
\r
2263 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
\r
2265 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
\r
2269 pkt->savedpos += 4;
\r
2270 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
\r
2272 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
\r
2273 pkt->savedpos += *length;
\r
2275 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
\r
2277 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
\r
2279 pkt->savedpos += length;
\r
2280 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
\r
2282 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
\r
2283 unsigned char **keystr)
\r
2287 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
\r
2288 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
\r
2294 pkt->savedpos += j;
\r
2295 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
\r
2299 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
\r
2304 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
\r
2305 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
\r
2310 pkt->savedpos += j;
\r
2313 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
\r
2319 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
\r
2324 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
\r
2329 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
\r
2330 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
\r
2331 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
\r
2332 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
\r
2333 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
\r
2335 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
\r
2336 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
\r
2337 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
\r
2339 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
\r
2340 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
\r
2342 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
\r
2343 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
\r
2346 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
\r
2347 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
\r
2349 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
\r
2350 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
\r
2351 int pos, len, siglen;
\r
2354 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
\r
2357 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
\r
2358 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
\r
2359 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
\r
2360 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
\r
2361 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
\r
2363 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
\r
2366 * Now find the signature integer.
\r
2368 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
\r
2369 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
\r
2370 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
\r
2372 if (len != siglen) {
\r
2373 unsigned char newlen[4];
\r
2374 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
\r
2375 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
\r
2376 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
\r
2377 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
\r
2378 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
\r
2379 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
\r
2380 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
\r
2382 while (len-- > siglen) {
\r
2383 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
\r
2384 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
\r
2386 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
\r
2387 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
\r
2391 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
\r
2394 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
\r
2395 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
\r
2399 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
\r
2400 * a list of known buggy implementations.
\r
2402 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
\r
2404 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
\r
2406 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
\r
2408 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
\r
2411 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
\r
2414 * General notes on server version strings:
\r
2415 * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
\r
2416 * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
\r
2417 * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
\r
2418 * so we can't distinguish them.
\r
2420 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
\r
2421 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
\r
2422 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
\r
2423 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
\r
2424 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
\r
2425 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
\r
2427 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
\r
2428 * to use a different defence against password length
\r
2431 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
\r
2432 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
\r
2435 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == FORCE_ON ||
\r
2436 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == AUTO &&
\r
2437 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
\r
2439 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
\r
2440 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
\r
2443 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
\r
2444 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
\r
2447 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == FORCE_ON ||
\r
2448 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == AUTO &&
\r
2449 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
\r
2451 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
\r
2452 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
\r
2453 * an AUTH_RSA message.
\r
2455 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
\r
2456 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
\r
2459 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == FORCE_ON ||
\r
2460 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO &&
\r
2461 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
\r
2462 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
\r
2463 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
\r
2464 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
\r
2466 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
\r
2468 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
\r
2469 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
\r
2472 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
\r
2473 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
\r
2474 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
\r
2475 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
\r
2477 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
\r
2478 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
\r
2479 * generate the keys).
\r
2481 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
\r
2482 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
\r
2485 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == FORCE_ON ||
\r
2486 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == AUTO &&
\r
2487 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
\r
2488 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
\r
2490 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
\r
2492 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
\r
2493 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
\r
2496 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == FORCE_ON ||
\r
2497 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == AUTO &&
\r
2498 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
\r
2500 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
\r
2501 * public-key authentication.
\r
2503 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
\r
2504 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
\r
2507 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
\r
2508 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == AUTO &&
\r
2509 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
\r
2510 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
\r
2511 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
\r
2512 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
\r
2513 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
\r
2514 /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
\r
2515 wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
\r
2517 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
\r
2519 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
\r
2520 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
\r
2523 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == FORCE_ON ||
\r
2524 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == AUTO &&
\r
2525 (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
\r
2526 wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
\r
2528 * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
\r
2530 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
\r
2531 logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
\r
2534 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore2 == FORCE_ON) {
\r
2536 * Servers that don't support SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. Currently,
\r
2537 * none detected automatically.
\r
2539 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE;
\r
2540 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 ignore bug");
\r
2545 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
\r
2546 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
\r
2548 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
\r
2550 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
\r
2551 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
\r
2552 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
\r
2553 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
\r
2554 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
\r
2555 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
\r
2556 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
\r
2558 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
\r
2561 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
\r
2568 * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
\r
2570 static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
\r
2574 if (ssh->version == 2) {
\r
2576 * Construct a v2 version string.
\r
2578 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
\r
2581 * Construct a v1 version string.
\r
2583 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
\r
2584 (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
\r
2589 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
\r
2591 if (ssh->version == 2) {
\r
2594 * Record our version string.
\r
2596 len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
\r
2597 ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
\r
2598 memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
\r
2599 ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
\r
2602 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
\r
2603 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
\r
2604 s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
\r
2608 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
\r
2610 struct do_ssh_init_state {
\r
2616 int proto1, proto2;
\r
2618 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
\r
2620 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
\r
2622 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
\r
2624 if (c != 'S') goto no;
\r
2626 if (c != 'S') goto no;
\r
2628 if (c != 'H') goto no;
\r
2630 if (c != '-') goto no;
\r
2633 while (c != '\012')
\r
2639 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
\r
2640 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
\r
2644 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
\r
2645 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
\r
2646 s->vstrsize += 16;
\r
2647 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
\r
2649 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
\r
2652 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
\r
2654 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
\r
2655 s->version[s->i++] = c;
\r
2656 } else if (c == '\012')
\r
2660 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
\r
2661 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
\r
2663 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
\r
2664 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
\r
2665 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
\r
2666 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
\r
2669 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
\r
2672 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
\r
2673 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
\r
2674 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
\r
2675 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
\r
2677 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0 && !s->proto1) {
\r
2678 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
\r
2681 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3 && !s->proto2) {
\r
2682 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
\r
2686 if (s->proto2 && (ssh->cfg.sshprot >= 2 || !s->proto1))
\r
2691 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
\r
2693 /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
\r
2694 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot != 3)
\r
2695 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
\r
2697 if (ssh->version == 2) {
\r
2700 * Record their version string.
\r
2702 len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
\r
2703 ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
\r
2704 memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
\r
2705 ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
\r
2708 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
\r
2710 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
\r
2711 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
\r
2712 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
\r
2715 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
\r
2717 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
\r
2718 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
\r
2719 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
\r
2721 if (ssh->version == 2)
\r
2722 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
\r
2724 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
\r
2725 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
\r
2726 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(&ssh->cfg, &ssh_backend, ssh);
\r
2728 sfree(s->vstring);
\r
2733 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
\r
2734 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
\r
2736 struct Packet *pktin;
\r
2738 pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
\r
2740 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
\r
2741 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
\r
2745 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
\r
2746 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
\r
2748 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
\r
2749 *data += *datalen;
\r
2753 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
\r
2756 unsigned char *data;
\r
2759 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
\r
2760 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
\r
2764 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
\r
2765 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
\r
2767 if (origlen > len)
\r
2768 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
\r
2772 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
\r
2775 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
\r
2776 ssh->frozen = frozen;
\r
2779 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
\r
2781 /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
\r
2783 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
\r
2786 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
\r
2789 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
\r
2790 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
\r
2791 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
\r
2792 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
\r
2795 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
\r
2797 crReturnV; /* more data please */
\r
2798 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
\r
2806 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
\r
2807 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
\r
2808 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
\r
2809 * to the proper protocol handler.
\r
2813 while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
\r
2814 if (ssh->frozen) {
\r
2815 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
\r
2816 /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
\r
2817 * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
\r
2818 * return, so break out. */
\r
2820 } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
\r
2821 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
\r
2823 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
\r
2825 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
\r
2827 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
\r
2829 /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
\r
2830 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
\r
2833 /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
\r
2839 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
\r
2842 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
2844 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
\r
2845 expire_timer_context(ssh);
\r
2850 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
\r
2855 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
\r
2856 * through this connection.
\r
2858 if (ssh->channels) {
\r
2859 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
\r
2860 switch (c->type) {
\r
2862 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
\r
2864 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
\r
2865 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
\r
2866 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
2869 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
\r
2870 if (ssh->version == 2)
\r
2871 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
\r
2876 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
\r
2877 * listening sockets.
\r
2879 if (ssh->portfwds) {
\r
2880 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
\r
2881 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
\r
2882 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
\r
2884 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
\r
2885 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
\r
2888 freetree234(ssh->portfwds);
\r
2889 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
\r
2895 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
\r
2896 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
\r
2898 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
\r
2899 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
\r
2901 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
\r
2904 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
\r
2906 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
\r
2912 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
\r
2915 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
\r
2916 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
\r
2919 if (!ssh->close_expected)
\r
2920 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
\r
2922 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
\r
2925 if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
\r
2926 ssh->exitcode = 0;
\r
2929 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
\r
2932 logevent(error_msg);
\r
2933 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
\r
2934 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
\r
2938 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
\r
2940 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
\r
2941 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
\r
2942 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
\r
2943 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
\r
2949 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
\r
2951 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
\r
2953 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
\r
2954 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
\r
2956 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
\r
2957 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
\r
2961 * Connect to specified host and port.
\r
2962 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
\r
2963 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
\r
2964 * freed by the caller.
\r
2966 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
\r
2967 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
\r
2969 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
\r
2980 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
\r
2983 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
\r
2984 ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
\r
2987 * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
\r
2990 * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
\r
2992 colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
\r
2996 ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
\r
2999 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
\r
3001 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
\r
3002 ssh->savedport = port;
\r
3006 * Try to find host.
\r
3008 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
\r
3009 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
\r
3010 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
\r
3011 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &ssh->cfg,
\r
3012 ssh->cfg.addressfamily);
\r
3013 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
\r
3014 sk_addr_free(addr);
\r
3017 ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
\r
3022 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
\r
3023 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
\r
3024 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, &ssh->cfg);
\r
3025 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
\r
3027 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
\r
3032 * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
\r
3033 * send the version string too.
\r
3035 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0)
\r
3037 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3) {
\r
3039 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
\r
3043 * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
\r
3045 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
\r
3047 *realhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
\r
3054 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
\r
3056 static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
\r
3058 int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
\r
3059 ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
\r
3060 assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
\r
3061 if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
\r
3062 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
\r
3063 } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
\r
3064 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
\r
3069 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
\r
3070 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
\r
3072 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
\r
3075 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
3077 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
\r
3079 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
\r
3080 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
\r
3081 if (!ssh->channels)
\r
3083 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
\r
3084 switch (c->type) {
\r
3085 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
\r
3087 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
\r
3091 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
\r
3094 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
\r
3096 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
\r
3097 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
\r
3103 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
\r
3105 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
\r
3107 ssh->agent_response = reply;
\r
3108 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
\r
3110 if (ssh->version == 1)
\r
3111 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
\r
3113 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
\r
3116 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
\r
3118 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
\r
3120 ssh->user_response = ret;
\r
3122 if (ssh->version == 1)
\r
3123 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
\r
3125 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
\r
3128 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
\r
3129 * queued-data run.
\r
3131 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
\r
3134 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
\r
3136 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
\r
3138 void *sentreply = reply;
\r
3141 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
\r
3142 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
\r
3145 if (ssh->version == 2) {
\r
3146 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
\r
3149 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
\r
3150 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
\r
3151 PKT_INT, replylen,
\r
3153 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
\r
3162 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
\r
3163 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
\r
3164 * => log `wire_reason'.
\r
3166 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
\r
3167 int code, int clean_exit)
\r
3170 if (!client_reason)
\r
3171 client_reason = wire_reason;
\r
3172 if (client_reason)
\r
3173 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
\r
3175 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
\r
3176 if (wire_reason) {
\r
3177 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
3178 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
\r
3180 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
\r
3181 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
\r
3182 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
\r
3183 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
\r
3184 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
\r
3185 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
\r
3188 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
\r
3189 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
\r
3190 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
\r
3195 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
\r
3197 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
\r
3198 struct Packet *pktin)
\r
3201 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
\r
3202 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
\r
3203 struct MD5Context md5c;
\r
3204 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
\r
3206 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
\r
3207 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
\r
3208 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
\r
3209 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
\r
3210 unsigned char session_id[16];
\r
3212 char username[100];
\r
3213 void *publickey_blob;
\r
3214 int publickey_bloblen;
\r
3215 char *publickey_comment;
\r
3216 int publickey_encrypted;
\r
3217 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
\r
3220 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
\r
3224 struct RSAKey key;
\r
3230 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
\r
3232 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
\r
3235 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
3237 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
\r
3238 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
\r
3242 logevent("Received public keys");
\r
3244 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
\r
3246 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
\r
3249 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
\r
3251 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
\r
3252 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
\r
3253 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
\r
3258 * Log the host key fingerprint.
\r
3262 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
\r
3263 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
\r
3264 hostkey.comment = NULL;
\r
3265 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
\r
3266 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
\r
3270 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
3271 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
3272 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
3273 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
\r
3274 s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
\r
3276 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
\r
3277 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
\r
3278 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
\r
3281 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
\r
3282 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
\r
3283 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
\r
3284 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
\r
3286 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
\r
3287 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
\r
3290 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
\r
3292 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
\r
3293 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
\r
3294 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
\r
3298 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
\r
3300 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
\r
3303 * Verify the host key.
\r
3307 * First format the key into a string.
\r
3309 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
\r
3310 char fingerprint[100];
\r
3311 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
\r
3312 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
\r
3313 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
\r
3315 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
\r
3316 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
\r
3317 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
\r
3318 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
\r
3319 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
\r
3321 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
\r
3325 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
\r
3326 " for user host key response"));
\r
3329 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
3330 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
\r
3332 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
\r
3334 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
\r
3335 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
\r
3341 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
\r
3342 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
\r
3344 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
\r
3347 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
\r
3348 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
\r
3350 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
\r
3352 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
\r
3354 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
\r
3357 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
\r
3361 logevent("Encrypted session key");
\r
3364 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
\r
3365 char *cipher_string = NULL;
\r
3367 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
\r
3368 int next_cipher = ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i];
\r
3369 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
\r
3370 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
\r
3372 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
\r
3373 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
\r
3374 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
\r
3376 switch (next_cipher) {
\r
3377 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
\r
3378 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
\r
3379 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
\r
3380 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
\r
3381 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
\r
3382 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
\r
3384 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
\r
3385 cipher_chosen = 1;
\r
3388 if (!cipher_chosen) {
\r
3389 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
\r
3390 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
\r
3391 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
\r
3393 /* shouldn't happen */
\r
3394 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
\r
3398 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
\r
3400 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
\r
3401 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
\r
3402 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
\r
3403 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
\r
3407 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
\r
3408 " for user response"));
\r
3411 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
3412 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
\r
3414 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
\r
3415 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
\r
3416 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
\r
3423 switch (s->cipher_type) {
\r
3424 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
\r
3425 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
\r
3427 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
\r
3428 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
\r
3430 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
\r
3431 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
\r
3435 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
\r
3436 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
\r
3437 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
\r
3438 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
\r
3439 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
\r
3440 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
\r
3442 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
\r
3446 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
\r
3447 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
\r
3449 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
\r
3450 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
\r
3451 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
\r
3453 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
\r
3454 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
\r
3456 if (servkey.modulus) {
\r
3457 sfree(servkey.modulus);
\r
3458 servkey.modulus = NULL;
\r
3460 if (servkey.exponent) {
\r
3461 sfree(servkey.exponent);
\r
3462 servkey.exponent = NULL;
\r
3464 if (hostkey.modulus) {
\r
3465 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
\r
3466 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
\r
3468 if (hostkey.exponent) {
\r
3469 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
\r
3470 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
\r
3472 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
3474 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
\r
3475 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
\r
3479 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
\r
3481 fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
\r
3483 if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
\r
3484 sizeof(s->username))) {
\r
3485 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
\r
3486 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
\r
3487 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
\r
3488 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
\r
3489 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
\r
3490 lenof(s->username));
\r
3491 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
\r
3494 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
\r
3495 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
\r
3500 * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
\r
3502 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
3503 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
\r
3506 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
\r
3507 lenof(s->username));
\r
3508 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
3511 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, s->username, PKT_END);
\r
3513 char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", s->username);
\r
3514 logevent(userlog);
\r
3515 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
\r
3516 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
\r
3517 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
\r
3518 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
\r
3524 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
3526 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
\r
3527 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
\r
3528 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
\r
3530 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
\r
3532 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
\r
3534 * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
\r
3536 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
\r
3538 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
\r
3539 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
\r
3540 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
\r
3541 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
\r
3542 const char *error;
\r
3543 if (rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
\r
3544 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
\r
3545 &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
\r
3546 s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
\r
3550 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
\r
3551 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
\r
3552 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
\r
3553 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
\r
3555 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
\r
3557 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
\r
3561 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
\r
3562 key_type_to_str(keytype));
\r
3563 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
\r
3565 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
\r
3566 key_type_to_str(keytype));
\r
3567 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
\r
3569 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
\r
3572 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
\r
3574 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
3575 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
\r
3577 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
\r
3579 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
\r
3583 s->authed = FALSE;
\r
3584 s->tried_agent = 1;
\r
3585 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
\r
3587 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
\r
3588 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
\r
3589 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
\r
3590 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
\r
3591 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
\r
3595 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
\r
3596 " for agent response"));
\r
3599 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
3600 r = ssh->agent_response;
\r
3601 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
\r
3603 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
\r
3604 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
\r
3605 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
\r
3606 s->p = s->response + 5;
\r
3607 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
\r
3609 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
\r
3610 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
\r
3611 unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
\r
3614 int n, ok = FALSE;
\r
3615 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
\r
3616 n = ssh1_read_bignum
\r
3617 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
\r
3618 &s->key.exponent);
\r
3622 n = ssh1_read_bignum
\r
3623 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
\r
3628 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
\r
3630 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
\r
3632 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
\r
3635 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
\r
3636 s->p += s->commentlen;
\r
3640 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
\r
3644 if (s->publickey_blob) {
\r
3645 if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
\r
3646 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
\r
3647 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
\r
3648 "configured key file", s->keyi);
\r
3649 s->tried_publickey = 1;
\r
3651 /* Skip non-configured key */
\r
3654 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
\r
3655 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
\r
3656 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
\r
3657 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
3658 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
\r
3659 logevent("Key refused");
\r
3662 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
\r
3663 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
\r
3664 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
\r
3669 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
\r
3672 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
\r
3673 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
\r
3674 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
\r
3675 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
\r
3676 len += 16; /* session id */
\r
3677 len += 4; /* response format */
\r
3678 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
\r
3679 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
\r
3681 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
\r
3682 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
\r
3684 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
\r
3685 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
\r
3686 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
\r
3687 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
\r
3689 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
\r
3690 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
\r
3691 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
\r
3696 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
\r
3697 " while waiting for agent"
\r
3701 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
3702 vret = ssh->agent_response;
\r
3703 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
\r
3708 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
\r
3709 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
\r
3710 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
\r
3711 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
\r
3714 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
3715 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
\r
3717 ("Pageant's response accepted");
\r
3718 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
\r
3719 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
\r
3721 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
\r
3723 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
\r
3728 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
\r
3731 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
\r
3735 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
\r
3738 freebn(s->key.exponent);
\r
3739 freebn(s->key.modulus);
\r
3740 freebn(s->challenge);
\r
3744 sfree(s->response);
\r
3745 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
\r
3746 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
\r
3748 logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
\r
3753 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
\r
3755 * Try public key authentication with the specified
\r
3758 int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
\r
3759 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
\r
3760 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
\r
3761 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
\r
3762 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
\r
3763 s->tried_publickey = 1;
\r
3764 got_passphrase = FALSE;
\r
3765 while (!got_passphrase) {
\r
3767 * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
\r
3769 char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
\r
3770 const char *error;
\r
3771 if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
\r
3772 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
\r
3773 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
\r
3774 passphrase = NULL;
\r
3776 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
\r
3777 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
\r
3778 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
\r
3779 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
\r
3780 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
\r
3781 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
\r
3782 s->publickey_comment),
\r
3783 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
3784 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
\r
3787 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
\r
3788 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
\r
3792 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
\r
3793 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
3794 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
\r
3798 passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
\r
3799 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
3802 * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
\r
3804 ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
\r
3807 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
\r
3808 sfree(passphrase);
\r
3811 /* Correct passphrase. */
\r
3812 got_passphrase = TRUE;
\r
3813 } else if (ret == 0) {
\r
3814 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
\r
3815 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
\r
3816 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
\r
3817 c_write_str(ssh, error);
\r
3818 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
\r
3819 got_passphrase = FALSE;
\r
3820 break; /* go and try something else */
\r
3821 } else if (ret == -1) {
\r
3822 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
\r
3823 got_passphrase = FALSE;
\r
3824 /* and try again */
\r
3826 assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
\r
3827 got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
\r
3831 if (got_passphrase) {
\r
3834 * Send a public key attempt.
\r
3836 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
\r
3837 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
\r
3839 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
3840 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
3841 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
\r
3842 continue; /* go and try something else */
\r
3844 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
\r
3845 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
\r
3851 unsigned char buffer[32];
\r
3852 Bignum challenge, response;
\r
3854 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
\r
3855 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
\r
3858 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
\r
3859 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
\r
3861 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
\r
3862 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
\r
3866 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
\r
3867 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
\r
3868 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
\r
3870 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
\r
3871 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
\r
3873 freebn(challenge);
\r
3877 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
3878 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
3879 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
\r
3880 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
\r
3881 " our public key.\r\n");
\r
3882 continue; /* go and try something else */
\r
3883 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
\r
3884 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
\r
3888 break; /* we're through! */
\r
3894 * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
\r
3896 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
\r
3898 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
\r
3899 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
\r
3900 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
\r
3901 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
\r
3902 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
\r
3903 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
\r
3904 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
3905 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
\r
3906 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
\r
3907 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
\r
3908 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
\r
3909 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
\r
3914 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
\r
3916 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
\r
3918 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
\r
3921 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
\r
3922 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
\r
3923 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
\r
3924 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
\r
3925 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
\r
3926 instr_suf = dupstr("");
\r
3927 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
\r
3929 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
\r
3930 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
\r
3932 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
\r
3933 dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
\r
3934 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
\r
3936 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
\r
3937 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
3941 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
\r
3942 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
\r
3943 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
\r
3944 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
\r
3945 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
\r
3946 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
\r
3947 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
3948 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
\r
3949 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
\r
3950 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
\r
3951 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
\r
3956 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
\r
3958 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
\r
3960 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
\r
3963 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
\r
3964 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
\r
3965 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
\r
3966 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
\r
3967 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
\r
3968 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
\r
3969 instr_suf = dupstr("");
\r
3970 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
\r
3972 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
\r
3973 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
\r
3975 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
\r
3976 dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
\r
3977 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
\r
3979 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
\r
3980 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
3984 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
\r
3985 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
\r
3986 bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
\r
3989 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
\r
3990 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
\r
3991 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
\r
3992 s->username, ssh->savedhost),
\r
3993 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
3997 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
\r
3998 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
\r
4002 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
\r
4003 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
\r
4006 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
\r
4007 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
\r
4012 * Failed to get a password (for example
\r
4013 * because one was supplied on the command line
\r
4014 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
\r
4016 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
4017 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
\r
4022 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
\r
4024 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
\r
4025 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
\r
4026 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
\r
4027 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
\r
4028 * The others are all random data in
\r
4029 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
\r
4030 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
\r
4031 * hence can't deduce the password length.
\r
4033 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
\r
4034 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
\r
4035 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
\r
4036 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
\r
4039 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
\r
4040 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
\r
4042 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
\r
4043 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
\r
4044 * packets containing string lengths N through
\r
4045 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
\r
4046 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
\r
4047 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
\r
4049 * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
\r
4050 * least in this context. For these servers, we need
\r
4051 * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
\r
4052 * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
\r
4053 * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
\r
4055 * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
\r
4056 * here _nor_ a padded password string.
\r
4057 * For these servers we are left with no defences
\r
4058 * against password length sniffing.
\r
4060 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
\r
4061 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
\r
4063 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
\r
4064 * we can use the primary defence.
\r
4066 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
\r
4069 pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
\r
4071 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
\r
4074 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
\r
4078 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
\r
4080 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
\r
4082 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
\r
4084 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
\r
4085 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
\r
4086 s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
\r
4087 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
\r
4089 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
\r
4091 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
\r
4092 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
\r
4094 randomstr[i] = '\0';
\r
4095 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
\r
4096 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
\r
4099 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
\r
4100 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
\r
4103 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
\r
4105 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
\r
4106 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
\r
4107 * can use the secondary defence.
\r
4113 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
\r
4114 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
\r
4116 strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
\r
4117 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
\r
4118 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
\r
4119 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
\r
4122 ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
\r
4124 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
\r
4125 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
\r
4126 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
\r
4127 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
\r
4130 * The server is believed unable to cope with
\r
4131 * any of our password camouflage methods.
\r
4134 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
\r
4135 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
\r
4136 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
\r
4137 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
\r
4138 PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
\r
4139 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
\r
4142 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
\r
4143 PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
\r
4144 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
\r
4146 logevent("Sent password");
\r
4147 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
4148 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
4149 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
4150 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
\r
4151 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
\r
4152 logevent("Authentication refused");
\r
4153 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
\r
4154 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
\r
4160 if (s->publickey_blob) {
\r
4161 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
\r
4162 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
\r
4165 logevent("Authentication successful");
\r
4170 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
\r
4174 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
\r
4179 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
\r
4180 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
\r
4181 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
\r
4182 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
\r
4183 * open, we can close it then.
\r
4185 if (!c->halfopen) {
\r
4186 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
4187 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
\r
4189 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
\r
4191 int bytes_to_send = bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
\r
4192 if (bytes_to_send > 0) {
\r
4194 * If we still have unsent data in our outgoing
\r
4195 * buffer for this channel, we can't actually
\r
4196 * initiate a close operation yet or that data
\r
4197 * will be lost. Instead, set the pending_close
\r
4198 * flag so that when we do clear the buffer
\r
4199 * we'll start closing the channel.
\r
4201 char logmsg[160] = {'\0'};
\r
4204 "Forwarded port pending to be closed : "
\r
4205 "%d bytes remaining",
\r
4209 c->pending_close = TRUE;
\r
4212 * No locally buffered data, so we can send the
\r
4213 * close message immediately.
\r
4215 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
4216 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
\r
4217 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
4218 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
4219 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
\r
4220 logevent("Nothing left to send, closing channel");
\r
4225 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
\r
4226 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
\r
4227 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
\r
4228 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
\r
4229 c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
\r
4230 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
\r
4231 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
\r
4236 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
\r
4240 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
\r
4243 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
4244 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
\r
4245 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
\r
4246 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
\r
4247 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
\r
4249 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
\r
4250 * connections are never individually throttled - because
\r
4251 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
\r
4252 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
\r
4253 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
\r
4257 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
\r
4258 return ssh2_try_send(c);
\r
4262 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
\r
4267 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
\r
4270 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
4271 buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
\r
4273 buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
\r
4274 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
\r
4276 if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
\r
4277 c->throttling_conn = 0;
\r
4278 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
\r
4282 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
4284 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
\r
4286 assert(qh != NULL);
\r
4288 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
\r
4290 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
\r
4291 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
\r
4292 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
\r
4294 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
\r
4295 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
\r
4296 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
\r
4300 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
\r
4302 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
\r
4303 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
\r
4304 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
\r
4306 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
\r
4307 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
\r
4308 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
\r
4311 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
\r
4312 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
\r
4315 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
\r
4320 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
\r
4321 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
\r
4323 struct queued_handler *qh;
\r
4325 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
\r
4328 qh->handler = handler;
\r
4332 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
\r
4335 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
\r
4336 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
\r
4337 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
\r
4339 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
\r
4340 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
\r
4341 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
\r
4344 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
\r
4349 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
\r
4351 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
\r
4353 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
\r
4354 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
\r
4355 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
\r
4358 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
\r
4361 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
\r
4362 assert(rpf == pf);
\r
4363 pf->pfrec->remote = NULL;
\r
4364 free_rportfwd(pf);
\r
4368 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
\r
4370 const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
\r
4371 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
\r
4374 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
\r
4375 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
\r
4378 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
\r
4379 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
\r
4380 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
\r
4381 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
\r
4382 * they were before.
\r
4384 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
\r
4386 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
\r
4387 epf->status = DESTROY;
\r
4390 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
\r
4391 char address_family, type;
\r
4392 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
\r
4393 char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
\r
4396 address_family = 'A';
\r
4398 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
\r
4399 *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
\r
4400 *portfwd_strptr == '6')
\r
4401 address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
\r
4402 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
\r
4403 *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
\r
4404 *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
\r
4405 type = *portfwd_strptr++;
\r
4410 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
\r
4411 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
\r
4413 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
\r
4414 * source port number. This means that
\r
4415 * everything we've seen until now is the
\r
4416 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
\r
4417 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
\r
4422 if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
\r
4423 logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
\r
4424 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
\r
4426 strcpy(saddr, sports);
\r
4429 if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
\r
4432 if (type != 'D') {
\r
4433 if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
\r
4436 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
\r
4437 if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
\r
4440 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
\r
4443 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
\r
4444 if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
\r
4448 dport = atoi(dports);
\r
4452 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
\r
4454 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
\r
4455 " port \"%s\"", dports);
\r
4459 while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
\r
4462 dport = dserv = -1;
\r
4463 portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
\r
4465 sport = atoi(sports);
\r
4469 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
\r
4471 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
\r
4472 " port \"%s\"", sports);
\r
4475 if (sport && dport) {
\r
4476 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
\r
4477 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
\r
4479 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
\r
4480 pfrec->type = type;
\r
4481 pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
\r
4482 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
\r
4483 pfrec->sport = sport;
\r
4484 pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
\r
4485 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
\r
4486 pfrec->dport = dport;
\r
4487 pfrec->local = NULL;
\r
4488 pfrec->remote = NULL;
\r
4489 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
\r
4490 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
\r
4493 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
\r
4494 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
\r
4495 if (epfrec->status == DESTROY) {
\r
4497 * We already have a port forwarding up and running
\r
4498 * with precisely these parameters. Hence, no need
\r
4499 * to do anything; simply re-tag the existing one
\r
4502 epfrec->status = KEEP;
\r
4505 * Anything else indicates that there was a duplicate
\r
4506 * in our input, which we'll silently ignore.
\r
4508 free_portfwd(pfrec);
\r
4510 pfrec->status = CREATE;
\r
4516 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
\r
4519 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
\r
4520 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
\r
4523 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
\r
4524 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
\r
4525 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
\r
4526 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
\r
4527 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
\r
4530 if (epf->type != 'D') {
\r
4531 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
\r
4532 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
\r
4537 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
\r
4540 /* epf->remote or epf->local may be NULL if setting up a
\r
4541 * forwarding failed. */
\r
4542 if (epf->remote) {
\r
4543 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
\r
4544 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
4547 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
\r
4550 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
4552 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
\r
4553 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
\r
4554 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
\r
4555 * the rportfwd record from the local end
\r
4556 * so that any connections the server tries
\r
4557 * to make on it are rejected.
\r
4560 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
\r
4561 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
\r
4562 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
\r
4564 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
\r
4565 } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
\r
4566 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
\r
4567 * what was used to open the original connection,
\r
4568 * since it's reconfigurable. */
\r
4569 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
\r
4571 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
\r
4573 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
\r
4574 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
4577 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
\r
4578 free_rportfwd(rpf);
\r
4579 } else if (epf->local) {
\r
4580 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
\r
4583 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
\r
4584 free_portfwd(epf);
\r
4585 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
\r
4589 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
\r
4591 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
\r
4592 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
\r
4593 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
\r
4594 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
\r
4595 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
\r
4596 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
\r
4597 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
\r
4598 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
\r
4600 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
\r
4601 if (epf->type == 'D') {
\r
4604 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
\r
4606 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
\r
4607 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
\r
4609 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
\r
4612 if (epf->type == 'L') {
\r
4613 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
\r
4614 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
\r
4617 epf->addressfamily);
\r
4619 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
\r
4620 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
\r
4621 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
\r
4622 sportdesc, dportdesc,
\r
4623 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
\r
4624 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
\r
4625 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
\r
4626 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
\r
4629 epf->addressfamily);
\r
4631 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
\r
4632 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
\r
4633 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
\r
4635 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
\r
4637 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
\r
4640 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
\r
4642 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
\r
4643 if (ssh->version == 1)
\r
4644 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
\r
4646 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
\r
4649 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
\r
4650 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
\r
4651 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
\r
4652 pf->dport = epf->dport;
\r
4653 pf->sport = epf->sport;
\r
4654 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
\r
4655 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
\r
4656 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
\r
4659 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
\r
4660 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
\r
4662 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
\r
4667 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
4668 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
\r
4669 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
\r
4670 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
\r
4671 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
\r
4673 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
\r
4674 SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
\r
4675 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
\r
4677 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
4678 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
\r
4679 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
\r
4680 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
\r
4682 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
\r
4683 } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
\r
4684 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
\r
4686 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
\r
4688 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
\r
4689 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
4691 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
\r
4692 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
\r
4693 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
\r
4702 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
4705 int stringlen, bufsize;
\r
4707 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
\r
4708 if (string == NULL) {
\r
4709 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
\r
4713 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
\r
4714 string, stringlen);
\r
4715 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
\r
4716 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
\r
4717 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
\r
4721 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
4723 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
\r
4724 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
\r
4725 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
4726 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
4728 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
\r
4729 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
\r
4730 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
\r
4731 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
\r
4732 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
\r
4733 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
\r
4735 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
\r
4738 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
\r
4739 NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
\r
4740 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
\r
4742 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
\r
4743 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
\r
4746 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
\r
4747 c->remoteid = remoteid;
\r
4748 c->halfopen = FALSE;
\r
4749 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
\r
4751 c->pending_close = FALSE;
\r
4752 c->throttling_conn = 0;
\r
4753 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
\r
4754 add234(ssh->channels, c);
\r
4755 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
\r
4756 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
\r
4757 c->localid, PKT_END);
\r
4758 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
\r
4763 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
4765 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
\r
4766 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
\r
4767 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
4768 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
4770 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
\r
4771 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
\r
4772 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
\r
4773 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
\r
4775 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
\r
4777 c->remoteid = remoteid;
\r
4778 c->halfopen = FALSE;
\r
4779 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
\r
4781 c->pending_close = FALSE;
\r
4782 c->throttling_conn = 0;
\r
4783 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
\r
4784 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
\r
4785 add234(ssh->channels, c);
\r
4786 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
\r
4787 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
\r
4792 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
4794 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
\r
4795 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
\r
4796 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
4797 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
\r
4799 int hostsize, port;
\r
4802 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
\r
4805 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
4806 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
\r
4807 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
4809 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
\r
4810 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
\r
4811 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
\r
4812 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
\r
4814 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
\r
4816 if (pfp == NULL) {
\r
4817 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
\r
4819 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
\r
4820 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
\r
4822 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
\r
4824 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
\r
4825 c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
\r
4827 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
\r
4829 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
\r
4830 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
\r
4832 c->remoteid = remoteid;
\r
4833 c->halfopen = FALSE;
\r
4834 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
\r
4836 c->pending_close = FALSE;
\r
4837 c->throttling_conn = 0;
\r
4838 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
\r
4839 add234(ssh->channels, c);
\r
4840 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
\r
4841 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
\r
4842 c->localid, PKT_END);
\r
4843 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
\r
4848 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
4850 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
4851 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
4852 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
4854 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
\r
4855 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
\r
4856 c->remoteid = localid;
\r
4857 c->halfopen = FALSE;
\r
4858 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
\r
4859 c->throttling_conn = 0;
\r
4860 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
4863 if (c && c->closes) {
\r
4865 * We have a pending close on this channel,
\r
4866 * which we decided on before the server acked
\r
4867 * the channel open. So now we know the
\r
4868 * remoteid, we can close it again.
\r
4870 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
\r
4871 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
\r
4875 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
4877 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
4878 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
4880 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
\r
4881 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
\r
4882 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
\r
4883 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
4884 del234(ssh->channels, c);
\r
4889 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
4891 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
\r
4892 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
4893 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
4894 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
\r
4895 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
\r
4898 (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
\r
4900 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
\r
4901 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
\r
4902 assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
\r
4903 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
\r
4904 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
\r
4906 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
\r
4907 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
\r
4908 assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
\r
4909 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
4910 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
\r
4913 c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
\r
4914 if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
\r
4915 send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
\r
4917 c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
\r
4920 if (c->closes == 15) {
\r
4921 del234(ssh->channels, c);
\r
4925 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
\r
4926 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
\r
4927 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
\r
4932 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
4934 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
\r
4935 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
4938 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
4940 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
\r
4942 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
\r
4945 switch (c->type) {
\r
4947 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
\r
4949 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
\r
4950 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
\r
4953 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
\r
4955 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
\r
4956 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
\r
4957 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
\r
4961 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
\r
4963 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
\r
4965 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
\r
4966 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
\r
4968 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
\r
4970 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
\r
4972 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
\r
4974 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
\r
4978 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
\r
4980 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
\r
4983 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
\r
4985 &reply, &replylen,
\r
4986 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
\r
4987 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
\r
4988 sfree(c->u.a.message);
\r
4989 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
\r
4992 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
\r
4995 if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
\r
4996 c->throttling_conn = 1;
\r
4997 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
\r
5002 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
5004 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
5005 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
\r
5006 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
\r
5008 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
\r
5009 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
\r
5010 * session which we might mistake for another
\r
5011 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
\r
5012 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
\r
5014 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
\r
5017 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
\r
5018 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
\r
5020 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
\r
5022 unsigned int arg = 0;
\r
5023 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
\r
5024 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
\r
5025 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
\r
5027 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
\r
5030 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
\r
5033 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
\r
5034 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
\r
5038 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
\r
5039 struct Packet *pktin)
\r
5041 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
\r
5043 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
\r
5044 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
\r
5045 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
\r
5047 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
\r
5048 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
\r
5049 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
\r
5050 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
\r
5051 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
\r
5052 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
\r
5053 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
\r
5054 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
\r
5055 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
\r
5057 if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
\r
5058 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
\r
5059 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
\r
5063 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
\r
5064 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
5065 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
\r
5067 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
5068 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
\r
5070 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
\r
5071 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
\r
5072 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
\r
5076 if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
\r
5077 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
\r
5078 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
\r
5079 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
\r
5081 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
\r
5082 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
\r
5083 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
\r
5084 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
\r
5085 * cookie into the log.
\r
5087 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
\r
5088 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
\r
5089 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
\r
5091 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
\r
5093 PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
\r
5096 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
\r
5097 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
\r
5099 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
\r
5106 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
\r
5107 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
5108 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
\r
5110 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
5111 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
\r
5113 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
\r
5114 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
\r
5115 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
\r
5119 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
\r
5120 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
\r
5122 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
\r
5123 struct Packet *pkt;
\r
5124 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
\r
5125 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
\r
5126 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
\r
5127 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
\r
5128 /* Send the pty request. */
\r
5129 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
\r
5130 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
\r
5131 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
\r
5132 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
\r
5133 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
\r
5134 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
\r
5135 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
\r
5136 ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
\r
5137 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
\r
5138 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
\r
5139 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
\r
5140 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
\r
5141 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
\r
5142 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
\r
5143 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
\r
5147 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
\r
5148 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
5149 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
\r
5151 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
5152 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
\r
5153 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
\r
5155 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
\r
5156 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
\r
5158 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
\r
5161 if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
\r
5162 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
\r
5166 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
\r
5167 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
5168 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
\r
5170 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
5171 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
\r
5173 logevent("Started compression");
\r
5174 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
\r
5175 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
\r
5176 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
\r
5177 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
\r
5178 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
\r
5182 * Start the shell or command.
\r
5184 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
\r
5185 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
\r
5186 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
\r
5189 char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
\r
5191 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
\r
5193 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
\r
5194 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
\r
5195 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
\r
5198 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
\r
5200 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
\r
5201 logevent("Started session");
\r
5204 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
\r
5205 if (ssh->size_needed)
\r
5206 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
\r
5207 if (ssh->eof_needed)
\r
5208 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
\r
5211 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
\r
5213 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
\r
5217 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
\r
5218 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
\r
5219 * attention to the unusual ones.
\r
5224 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
\r
5225 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
\r
5226 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
\r
5227 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
\r
5228 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
\r
5230 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
\r
5234 while (inlen > 0) {
\r
5235 int len = min(inlen, 512);
\r
5236 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
\r
5237 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
\r
5238 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
\r
5249 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
\r
5251 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
5256 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
\r
5257 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
\r
5260 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
5262 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
\r
5266 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
\r
5267 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
\r
5270 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
5272 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
\r
5275 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
\r
5280 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
\r
5282 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
\r
5283 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
\r
5286 * These special message types we install handlers for.
\r
5288 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
\r
5289 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
\r
5290 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
\r
5293 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
\r
5294 struct Packet *pktin)
\r
5296 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
\r
5297 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
\r
5300 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
\r
5301 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
\r
5305 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
\r
5306 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
\r
5307 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
\r
5312 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
\r
5316 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
\r
5318 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
\r
5321 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
\r
5323 needlen = strlen(needle);
\r
5326 * Is it at the start of the string?
\r
5328 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
\r
5329 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
\r
5330 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
\r
5331 /* either , or EOS follows */
\r
5335 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
\r
5336 * If no comma found, terminate.
\r
5338 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
\r
5339 haylen--, haystack++;
\r
5342 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
\r
5347 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
\r
5349 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
\r
5352 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
\r
5354 needlen = strlen(needle);
\r
5356 * Is it at the start of the string?
\r
5358 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
\r
5359 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
\r
5360 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
\r
5361 /* either , or EOS follows */
\r
5369 * SSH-2 key creation method.
\r
5370 * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
\r
5371 * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
\r
5373 #define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
\r
5374 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
\r
5375 unsigned char *keyspace)
\r
5377 const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
\r
5379 /* First hlen bytes. */
\r
5381 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
\r
5382 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
\r
5383 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
\r
5384 h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
\r
5385 h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
\r
5386 h->final(s, keyspace);
\r
5387 /* Next hlen bytes. */
\r
5389 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
\r
5390 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
\r
5391 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
\r
5392 h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
\r
5393 h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
\r
5397 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
\r
5399 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
\r
5400 struct Packet *pktin)
\r
5402 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
\r
5403 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
\r
5404 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
\r
5405 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
\r
5406 void *our_kexinit;
\r
5407 int our_kexinitlen;
\r
5408 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
\r
5409 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
\r
5411 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
\r
5412 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
\r
5413 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
\r
5414 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
\r
5415 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
\r
5416 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
\r
5417 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
\r
5418 int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
\r
5419 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
\r
5420 void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
\r
5421 unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
\r
5422 int n_preferred_kex;
\r
5423 const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
\r
5424 int n_preferred_ciphers;
\r
5425 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
\r
5426 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
\r
5427 int userauth_succeeded; /* for delayed compression */
\r
5428 int pending_compression;
\r
5429 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
\r
5430 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
5435 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
\r
5437 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
\r
5439 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
\r
5440 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
\r
5441 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
\r
5443 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
\r
5444 s->userauth_succeeded = FALSE;
\r
5445 s->pending_compression = FALSE;
\r
5448 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
\r
5450 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
\r
5451 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
\r
5453 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
\r
5455 begin_key_exchange:
\r
5456 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
\r
5458 int i, j, commalist_started;
\r
5461 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
\r
5463 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
\r
5464 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
\r
5465 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
\r
5467 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
\r
5468 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
\r
5470 case KEX_DHGROUP14:
\r
5471 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
\r
5472 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
\r
5474 case KEX_DHGROUP1:
\r
5475 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
\r
5476 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
\r
5479 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
\r
5483 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
\r
5485 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
\r
5486 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
\r
5493 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
\r
5495 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
\r
5496 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
\r
5497 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
\r
5498 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
\r
5499 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
\r
5502 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
\r
5503 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
\r
5507 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
\r
5510 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
\r
5512 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
\r
5513 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
\r
5516 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
\r
5518 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
\r
5519 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
\r
5526 * Set up preferred compression.
\r
5528 if (ssh->cfg.compression)
\r
5529 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
\r
5531 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
\r
5534 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
\r
5535 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
\r
5537 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
\r
5540 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
\r
5542 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
\r
5545 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
\r
5547 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
\r
5548 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
\r
5549 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
\r
5550 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
\r
5551 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
5552 commalist_started = 0;
\r
5553 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
\r
5554 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
\r
5555 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
\r
5556 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
\r
5557 if (commalist_started)
\r
5558 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
\r
5559 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
\r
5560 commalist_started = 1;
\r
5563 /* List server host key algorithms. */
\r
5564 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
5565 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
\r
5566 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
\r
5567 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
\r
5568 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
\r
5570 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
\r
5571 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
5572 commalist_started = 0;
\r
5573 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
\r
5574 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
\r
5575 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
\r
5576 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
\r
5577 if (commalist_started)
\r
5578 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
\r
5579 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
\r
5580 commalist_started = 1;
\r
5583 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
\r
5584 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
5585 commalist_started = 0;
\r
5586 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
\r
5587 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
\r
5588 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
\r
5589 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
\r
5590 if (commalist_started)
\r
5591 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
\r
5592 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
\r
5593 commalist_started = 1;
\r
5596 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
\r
5597 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
5598 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
\r
5599 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
\r
5600 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
\r
5601 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
\r
5603 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
\r
5604 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
5605 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
\r
5606 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
\r
5607 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
\r
5608 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
\r
5610 /* List client->server compression algorithms,
\r
5611 * then server->client compression algorithms. (We use the
\r
5612 * same set twice.) */
\r
5613 for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
\r
5614 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
5615 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
\r
5616 /* Prefer non-delayed versions */
\r
5617 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
\r
5618 /* We don't even list delayed versions of algorithms until
\r
5619 * they're allowed to be used, to avoid a race. See the end of
\r
5620 * this function. */
\r
5621 if (s->userauth_succeeded && s->preferred_comp->delayed_name) {
\r
5622 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
\r
5623 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout,
\r
5624 s->preferred_comp->delayed_name);
\r
5626 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
\r
5627 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
\r
5628 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
\r
5629 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
\r
5630 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
\r
5631 if (s->userauth_succeeded && c->delayed_name) {
\r
5632 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
\r
5633 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->delayed_name);
\r
5638 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
\r
5639 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
5640 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
\r
5641 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
5642 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
\r
5643 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
\r
5645 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
\r
5648 s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
\r
5649 s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
\r
5650 memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
\r
5652 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
5655 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
5658 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
\r
5662 char *str, *preferred;
\r
5665 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
\r
5666 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
\r
5670 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
\r
5671 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
\r
5672 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
\r
5673 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
\r
5674 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
\r
5675 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
\r
5676 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
\r
5677 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
\r
5679 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
\r
5680 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
\r
5683 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
\r
5684 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
\r
5686 s->warn_kex = TRUE;
\r
5688 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
\r
5689 if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
\r
5690 if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
\r
5691 ssh->kex = k->list[j];
\r
5700 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
\r
5701 str ? str : "(null)"));
\r
5705 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
\r
5706 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
\r
5707 * we end up using.
\r
5709 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
\r
5710 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
\r
5711 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
\r
5712 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
\r
5713 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
\r
5717 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
\r
5718 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
\r
5719 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
\r
5720 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
\r
5721 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
\r
5723 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
\r
5725 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
\r
5726 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
\r
5727 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
\r
5732 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
\r
5735 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
\r
5736 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
\r
5737 str ? str : "(null)"));
\r
5741 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
\r
5742 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
\r
5743 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
\r
5745 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
\r
5747 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
\r
5748 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
\r
5749 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
\r
5754 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
\r
5757 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
\r
5758 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
\r
5759 str ? str : "(null)"));
\r
5763 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
\r
5764 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
\r
5765 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
\r
5766 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
\r
5770 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
\r
5771 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
\r
5772 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
\r
5773 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
\r
5777 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
\r
5778 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
\r
5779 const struct ssh_compress *c =
\r
5780 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
\r
5781 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
\r
5782 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
\r
5784 } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
\r
5785 if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
\r
5786 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
\r
5789 s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
\r
5793 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
\r
5794 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
\r
5795 const struct ssh_compress *c =
\r
5796 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
\r
5797 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
\r
5798 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
\r
5800 } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
\r
5801 if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
\r
5802 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
\r
5805 s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
\r
5809 if (s->pending_compression) {
\r
5810 logevent("Server supports delayed compression; "
\r
5811 "will try this later");
\r
5813 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
\r
5814 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
\r
5815 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
\r
5817 if (s->warn_kex) {
\r
5818 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
\r
5819 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
\r
5821 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
\r
5822 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
\r
5826 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
\r
5827 " waiting for user response"));
\r
5830 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
5831 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
\r
5833 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
\r
5834 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
\r
5835 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
\r
5841 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
\r
5842 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
\r
5843 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
\r
5844 "client-to-server cipher",
\r
5845 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
\r
5846 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
\r
5847 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
\r
5851 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
\r
5852 " waiting for user response"));
\r
5855 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
5856 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
\r
5858 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
\r
5859 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
\r
5860 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
\r
5866 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
\r
5867 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
\r
5868 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
\r
5869 "server-to-client cipher",
\r
5870 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
\r
5871 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
\r
5872 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
\r
5876 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
\r
5877 " waiting for user response"));
\r
5880 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
5881 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
\r
5883 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
\r
5884 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
\r
5885 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
\r
5891 ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
\r
5892 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
\r
5893 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
\r
5894 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
\r
5895 s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
\r
5896 sfree(s->our_kexinit);
\r
5897 if (pktin->length > 5)
\r
5898 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
\r
5899 pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
\r
5901 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
\r
5902 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
\r
5905 if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
\r
5907 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
\r
5908 * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
\r
5909 * either cipher...
\r
5912 int csbits, scbits;
\r
5914 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
\r
5915 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
\r
5916 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
\r
5918 /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
\r
5919 * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
\r
5920 if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
\r
5921 s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
\r
5924 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
\r
5925 * requesting a group.
\r
5927 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
\r
5928 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
\r
5929 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
\r
5931 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
\r
5934 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
\r
5935 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
\r
5936 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
\r
5937 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
5939 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
5940 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
\r
5941 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
\r
5944 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
\r
5945 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
\r
5946 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
\r
5947 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
\r
5950 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
\r
5951 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
\r
5952 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
\r
5954 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
\r
5955 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
\r
5956 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
\r
5957 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
\r
5958 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
\r
5959 ssh->kex->groupname);
\r
5962 logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
\r
5963 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
\r
5965 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
\r
5967 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
\r
5968 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
\r
5969 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
\r
5970 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
\r
5971 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
5973 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
\r
5974 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
5975 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
\r
5976 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
\r
5979 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
\r
5980 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
\r
5981 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
\r
5982 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
\r
5984 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
\r
5987 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
\r
5989 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
\r
5991 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
\r
5992 * involve user interaction. */
\r
5993 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
\r
5995 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
\r
5996 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
\r
5997 hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
\r
5998 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
\r
5999 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
\r
6001 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
\r
6002 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
\r
6004 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
\r
6006 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
\r
6011 logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
\r
6012 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
\r
6013 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
\r
6015 * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
\r
6016 * from the server.
\r
6018 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
6019 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
\r
6020 bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
\r
6024 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
\r
6025 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
\r
6026 s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
\r
6027 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
\r
6031 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
\r
6032 s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
\r
6033 memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
\r
6036 s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
\r
6038 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
\r
6039 bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
\r
6043 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
\r
6046 * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
\r
6047 * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
\r
6048 * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
\r
6052 int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
\r
6053 int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
\r
6055 unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
\r
6056 int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
\r
6058 s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
\r
6060 for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
\r
6061 if ((i & 7) == 0) {
\r
6062 byte = random_byte();
\r
6064 bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
\r
6068 * Encode this as an mpint.
\r
6070 kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
\r
6071 kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
\r
6072 PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
\r
6073 memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
\r
6076 * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
\r
6078 outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
\r
6079 outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
\r
6080 ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
\r
6081 outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
\r
6084 * And send it off in a return packet.
\r
6086 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
\r
6087 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
6088 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
\r
6089 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
6091 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
\r
6098 ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
\r
6100 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
6101 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
\r
6102 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
\r
6103 bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
\r
6107 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
\r
6109 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
\r
6112 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
\r
6113 assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
\r
6114 ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
\r
6116 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
\r
6119 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
\r
6120 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
\r
6124 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
\r
6125 (char *)s->exchange_hash,
\r
6126 ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
\r
6127 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
\r
6132 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
\r
6133 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
\r
6135 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
\r
6136 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
\r
6137 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
\r
6138 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
\r
6139 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
\r
6140 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
\r
6142 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
\r
6143 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
\r
6147 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
\r
6148 " for user host key response"));
\r
6151 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
6152 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
\r
6154 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
\r
6155 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
\r
6156 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
\r
6160 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
\r
6161 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
\r
6162 logevent(s->fingerprint);
\r
6164 sfree(s->fingerprint);
\r
6166 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
\r
6169 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
\r
6170 * the session id, used in session key construction and
\r
6173 if (!s->got_session_id) {
\r
6174 assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
\r
6175 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
\r
6176 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
\r
6177 ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
\r
6178 assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
\r
6179 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
\r
6183 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
\r
6185 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
\r
6186 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
6187 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
\r
6190 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
\r
6191 * client-to-server session keys.
\r
6193 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
\r
6194 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
\r
6195 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
\r
6196 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
\r
6198 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
\r
6199 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
\r
6200 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
\r
6201 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
\r
6203 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
\r
6204 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
\r
6205 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
\r
6206 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
\r
6209 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
\r
6210 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
\r
6213 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
\r
6214 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
\r
6215 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
\r
6216 assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
\r
6217 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
\r
6218 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
\r
6219 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
\r
6220 assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
\r
6221 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
\r
6222 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
\r
6223 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
\r
6224 assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
\r
6225 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
\r
6226 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
\r
6227 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
\r
6230 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
\r
6231 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
\r
6232 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
\r
6233 ssh->csmac->text_name);
\r
6234 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
\r
6235 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
\r
6236 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
\r
6239 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
\r
6240 * our queued higher-layer packets.
\r
6242 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
\r
6243 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
\r
6246 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
\r
6248 crWaitUntil(pktin);
\r
6249 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
\r
6250 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
\r
6253 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
\r
6256 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
\r
6257 * server-to-client session keys.
\r
6259 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
\r
6260 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
\r
6261 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
\r
6262 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
\r
6264 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
\r
6265 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
\r
6266 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
\r
6267 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
\r
6269 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
\r
6270 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
\r
6271 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
\r
6272 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
\r
6275 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
\r
6276 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
\r
6279 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
\r
6280 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
\r
6281 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
\r
6282 assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
\r
6283 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
\r
6284 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
\r
6285 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
\r
6286 assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
\r
6287 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
\r
6288 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
\r
6289 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
\r
6290 assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
\r
6291 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
\r
6292 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
\r
6293 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
\r
6295 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
\r
6296 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
\r
6297 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
\r
6298 ssh->scmac->text_name);
\r
6299 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
\r
6300 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
\r
6301 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
\r
6304 * Free shared secret.
\r
6309 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
\r
6310 * deferred rekey reason.
\r
6312 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
\r
6313 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
\r
6315 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
\r
6316 goto begin_key_exchange;
\r
6320 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
\r
6322 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
\r
6323 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
\r
6324 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
\r
6325 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
\r
6329 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
\r
6330 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
\r
6331 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
\r
6332 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
\r
6333 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
\r
6334 * it would only confuse the layer above.
\r
6336 if (s->activated_authconn) {
\r
6339 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
\r
6342 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
\r
6343 * function so that other things can run on top of the
\r
6344 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
\r
6347 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
\r
6348 * inlen negative, because this is a special signal meaning
\r
6349 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
\r
6350 * giving the reason for the rekey.
\r
6352 * inlen==-1 means always initiate a rekey;
\r
6353 * inlen==-2 means that userauth has completed successfully and
\r
6354 * we should consider rekeying (for delayed compression).
\r
6356 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
\r
6357 (!pktin && inlen < 0))) {
\r
6362 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
\r
6364 if (inlen == -2) {
\r
6366 * authconn has seen a USERAUTH_SUCCEEDED. Time to enable
\r
6367 * delayed compression, if it's available.
\r
6369 * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00 says that you
\r
6370 * negotiate delayed compression in the first key exchange, and
\r
6371 * both sides start compressing when the server has sent
\r
6372 * USERAUTH_SUCCESS. This has a race condition -- the server
\r
6373 * can't know when the client has seen it, and thus which incoming
\r
6374 * packets it should treat as compressed.
\r
6376 * Instead, we do the initial key exchange without offering the
\r
6377 * delayed methods, but note if the server offers them; when we
\r
6378 * get here, if a delayed method was available that was higher
\r
6379 * on our list than what we got, we initiate a rekey in which we
\r
6380 * _do_ list the delayed methods (and hopefully get it as a
\r
6381 * result). Subsequent rekeys will do the same.
\r
6383 assert(!s->userauth_succeeded); /* should only happen once */
\r
6384 s->userauth_succeeded = TRUE;
\r
6385 if (!s->pending_compression)
\r
6386 /* Can't see any point rekeying. */
\r
6387 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
\r
6388 /* else fall through to rekey... */
\r
6389 s->pending_compression = FALSE;
\r
6392 * Now we've decided to rekey.
\r
6394 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
\r
6395 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
\r
6396 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
\r
6397 * we process it anyway!)
\r
6399 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
\r
6400 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
\r
6402 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
\r
6403 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
\r
6404 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
\r
6405 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
\r
6406 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
\r
6408 schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
\r
6411 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is still utterly horrid */
\r
6413 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
\r
6416 goto begin_key_exchange;
\r
6422 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
\r
6424 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
\r
6427 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
\r
6431 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
\r
6433 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
\r
6436 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
6438 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
\r
6441 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
\r
6442 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
\r
6443 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
\r
6444 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
\r
6445 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
\r
6446 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
\r
6447 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
6448 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
\r
6449 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
\r
6450 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
\r
6451 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
\r
6452 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
6453 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
\r
6454 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
\r
6458 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
\r
6461 return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
\r
6464 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(Ssh ssh, struct ssh_channel *c)
\r
6468 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
\r
6469 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
\r
6470 if (bufsize == 0) {
\r
6471 switch (c->type) {
\r
6472 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
\r
6473 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
\r
6474 * notification since it will be polled */
\r
6477 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
\r
6480 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
\r
6481 * buffer management */
\r
6483 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
\r
6484 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
6490 * If we've emptied the channel's output buffer and there's a
\r
6491 * pending close event, start the channel-closing procedure.
\r
6493 if (c->pending_close && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) == 0) {
\r
6494 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
6495 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
\r
6496 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
6497 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
6499 c->pending_close = FALSE;
\r
6504 * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
\r
6506 static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
\r
6509 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
\r
6511 c->pending_close = FALSE;
\r
6512 c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
\r
6513 c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
\r
6514 ssh->cfg.ssh_simple ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
\r
6515 c->v.v2.winadj_head = c->v.v2.winadj_tail = NULL;
\r
6516 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
\r
6517 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
\r
6521 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
\r
6523 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
\r
6528 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
\r
6529 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
\r
6530 * be sending any more data anyway.
\r
6532 if (c->closes != 0)
\r
6536 * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
\r
6537 * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
\r
6538 * window as well).
\r
6540 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
\r
6541 newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
\r
6545 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
\r
6546 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
\r
6547 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
\r
6549 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
\r
6551 if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
\r
6552 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
6553 struct winadj *wa;
\r
6556 * In order to keep track of how much window the client
\r
6557 * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
\r
6558 * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
\r
6559 * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
\r
6561 * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
\r
6562 * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
\r
6563 * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
\r
6565 * We also only send this if the main channel has finished its
\r
6566 * initial CHANNEL_REQUESTs and installed the default
\r
6567 * CHANNEL_FAILURE handler, so as not to risk giving it
\r
6568 * unexpected CHANNEL_FAILUREs.
\r
6570 if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
\r
6571 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE]) {
\r
6572 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
6573 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
6574 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
\r
6575 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, TRUE);
\r
6576 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
6579 * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of
\r
6580 * what message caused it, so we have to keep track of the
\r
6581 * outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
\r
6583 wa = snew(struct winadj);
\r
6584 wa->size = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
\r
6586 if (!c->v.v2.winadj_head)
\r
6587 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa;
\r
6589 c->v.v2.winadj_tail->next = wa;
\r
6590 c->v.v2.winadj_tail = wa;
\r
6591 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
\r
6592 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
\r
6594 /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
\r
6595 c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
\r
6596 c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
\r
6598 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
\r
6599 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
6600 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
\r
6601 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
6602 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
\r
6607 * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
\r
6608 * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
\r
6610 static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6612 unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
6613 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6615 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
\r
6617 (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
\r
6618 pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
\r
6619 char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
\r
6620 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
\r
6622 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
\r
6623 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
\r
6630 static int ssh2_handle_winadj_response(struct ssh_channel *c)
\r
6632 struct winadj *wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
\r
6635 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa->next;
\r
6636 c->v.v2.remlocwin += wa->size;
\r
6639 * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
\r
6640 * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
\r
6643 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
\r
6644 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
\r
6648 static void ssh2_msg_channel_success(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6651 * This should never get called. All channel requests are either
\r
6652 * sent with want_reply false, are sent before this handler gets
\r
6653 * installed, or are "winadj@putty" requests, which servers should
\r
6654 * never respond to with success.
\r
6656 * However, at least one server ("boks_sshd") is known to return
\r
6657 * SUCCESS for channel requests it's never heard of, such as
\r
6658 * "winadj@putty". Raised with foxt.com as bug 090916-090424, but
\r
6659 * for the sake of a quiet life, we handle it just the same as the
\r
6660 * expected FAILURE.
\r
6662 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6664 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
\r
6667 if (!ssh2_handle_winadj_response(c))
\r
6668 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
\r
6669 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS",
\r
6670 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
\r
6673 static void ssh2_msg_channel_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6676 * The only time this should get called is for "winadj@putty"
\r
6677 * messages sent above. All other channel requests are either
\r
6678 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
\r
6681 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6683 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
\r
6686 if (!ssh2_handle_winadj_response(c))
\r
6687 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
\r
6688 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE",
\r
6689 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
\r
6692 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6694 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6695 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
\r
6699 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
6700 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
\r
6704 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6708 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6709 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
\r
6712 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
\r
6713 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
\r
6714 return; /* extended but not stderr */
\r
6715 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
\r
6718 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
\r
6719 c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
\r
6720 switch (c->type) {
\r
6721 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
\r
6723 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
\r
6724 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
\r
6728 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
\r
6730 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
\r
6731 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
\r
6734 while (length > 0) {
\r
6735 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
\r
6736 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
\r
6737 (unsigned)length);
\r
6738 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
\r
6742 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
\r
6744 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
\r
6746 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
\r
6747 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
\r
6749 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
\r
6751 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
\r
6753 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
\r
6754 (unsigned)length);
\r
6755 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
\r
6759 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
\r
6761 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
\r
6764 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
\r
6766 &reply, &replylen,
\r
6767 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
\r
6768 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
\r
6769 sfree(c->u.a.message);
\r
6770 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
\r
6777 * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
\r
6778 * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
\r
6781 if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
\r
6782 c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
\r
6783 c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
\r
6785 * If we are not buffering too much data,
\r
6786 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
\r
6787 * If we are buffering too much, we may still
\r
6788 * need to adjust the window if the server's
\r
6789 * sent excess data.
\r
6791 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
\r
6792 c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
\r
6794 * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
\r
6795 * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
\r
6796 * throttle the whole channel.
\r
6798 if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
\r
6799 (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple && bufsize > 0)) &&
\r
6800 !c->throttling_conn) {
\r
6801 c->throttling_conn = 1;
\r
6802 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
\r
6807 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6809 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6811 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
\r
6815 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
\r
6817 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
\r
6818 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
\r
6820 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
\r
6821 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
\r
6823 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
\r
6825 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
\r
6826 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
6827 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
\r
6832 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6834 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6835 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
6837 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
\r
6840 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
\r
6841 switch (c->type) {
\r
6842 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
\r
6843 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
\r
6844 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
\r
6847 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
\r
6848 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
\r
6854 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
\r
6855 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
\r
6856 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
6860 if (c->closes == 0) {
\r
6861 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
\r
6862 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
6863 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
6865 del234(ssh->channels, c);
\r
6866 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
\r
6870 * See if that was the last channel left open.
\r
6871 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
\r
6872 * not running in -N mode.)
\r
6874 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell && count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
\r
6876 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
\r
6877 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
\r
6878 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
\r
6879 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
\r
6880 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
\r
6881 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
\r
6882 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
\r
6883 * this is more polite than sending a
\r
6884 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
\r
6886 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
\r
6890 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6892 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6893 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
6895 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
\r
6898 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
\r
6899 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
\r
6900 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
6901 c->halfopen = FALSE;
\r
6902 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
\r
6903 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
6904 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
6906 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
6909 * We have a pending close on this channel,
\r
6910 * which we decided on before the server acked
\r
6911 * the channel open. So now we know the
\r
6912 * remoteid, we can close it again.
\r
6914 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
\r
6915 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
6916 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
6920 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6922 static const char *const reasons[] = {
\r
6923 "<unknown reason code>",
\r
6924 "Administratively prohibited",
\r
6926 "Unknown channel type",
\r
6927 "Resource shortage",
\r
6929 unsigned reason_code;
\r
6930 char *reason_string;
\r
6931 int reason_length;
\r
6932 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6933 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
\r
6936 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
\r
6937 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
\r
6939 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
6940 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
\r
6941 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
\r
6942 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
\r
6943 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
\r
6944 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
\r
6946 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
6948 del234(ssh->channels, c);
\r
6952 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
6955 int typelen, want_reply;
\r
6956 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
\r
6957 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
6958 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
6960 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
\r
6963 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
\r
6964 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
\r
6967 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
\r
6968 * the request type string to see if it's something
\r
6971 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
\r
6973 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
\r
6974 * the primary channel.
\r
6976 if (typelen == 11 &&
\r
6977 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
\r
6979 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
6980 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
\r
6982 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
\r
6984 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
\r
6985 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
\r
6987 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
\r
6988 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
\r
6990 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
\r
6991 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
\r
6992 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
\r
6993 * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
\r
6994 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
\r
6995 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
\r
6997 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
\r
6999 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
\r
7000 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
\r
7001 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
\r
7005 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
\r
7006 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
\r
7008 long q = offset; \
\r
7009 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
\r
7010 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
\r
7011 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
\r
7012 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
\r
7016 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
\r
7017 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
\r
7018 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
\r
7019 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
\r
7021 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
\r
7024 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
\r
7025 is_plausible = FALSE;
\r
7028 ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
\r
7029 if (is_plausible) {
\r
7031 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
\r
7032 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
7033 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
\r
7034 ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
\r
7036 /* As per RFC 4254. */
\r
7039 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
\r
7040 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
\r
7041 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
\r
7043 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
\r
7048 * Really hideous method of translating the
\r
7049 * signal description back into a locally
\r
7050 * meaningful number.
\r
7055 #define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
\r
7056 else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
\r
7057 ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
\r
7059 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
\r
7062 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
\r
7065 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
\r
7068 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
\r
7071 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
\r
7074 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
\r
7077 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
\r
7080 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
\r
7083 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
\r
7086 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
\r
7089 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
\r
7092 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
\r
7095 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
\r
7097 #undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
\r
7099 ssh->exitcode = 128;
\r
7101 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
\r
7102 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
\r
7104 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
\r
7106 /* ignore lang tag */
\r
7107 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
\r
7108 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
\r
7109 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
\r
7111 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
\r
7112 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
\r
7113 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
\r
7118 * This is a channel request we don't know
\r
7119 * about, so we now either ignore the request
\r
7120 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
\r
7123 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
\r
7126 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
\r
7127 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
7128 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
7132 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
7135 int typelen, want_reply;
\r
7136 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
7138 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
\r
7139 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
\r
7142 * We currently don't support any global requests
\r
7143 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
\r
7144 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
\r
7148 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
\r
7149 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
7153 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
7160 char *error = NULL;
\r
7161 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
7162 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
\r
7163 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
7165 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
\r
7166 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
\r
7169 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
7170 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
7171 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
7173 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
\r
7175 const char *x11err;
\r
7177 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
\r
7178 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
\r
7179 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
\r
7180 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
\r
7181 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
7183 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
\r
7184 addrstr, peerport);
\r
7186 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
\r
7187 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
\r
7188 else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
\r
7189 addrstr, peerport, &ssh->cfg)) != NULL) {
\r
7190 logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
\r
7191 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
\r
7193 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
\r
7194 c->type = CHAN_X11;
\r
7198 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
\r
7199 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
\r
7200 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
\r
7203 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
\r
7204 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
7205 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
\r
7206 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
7207 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
\r
7208 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
\r
7209 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
\r
7210 if (realpf == NULL) {
\r
7211 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
\r
7213 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
\r
7217 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
\r
7218 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
\r
7219 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
\r
7221 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
\r
7222 error = "Port open failed";
\r
7224 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
\r
7225 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
\r
7228 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
\r
7229 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
\r
7230 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
\r
7231 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
\r
7233 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
\r
7234 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
\r
7237 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
\r
7240 c->remoteid = remid;
\r
7241 c->halfopen = FALSE;
\r
7243 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
\r
7244 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
7245 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
\r
7246 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
\r
7247 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
\r
7248 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
7249 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
\r
7252 ssh2_channel_init(c);
\r
7253 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
\r
7254 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
\r
7255 add234(ssh->channels, c);
\r
7256 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
\r
7257 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
\r
7258 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
\r
7259 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
\r
7260 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
\r
7261 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
7266 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point,
\r
7267 * if we're going to display them.
\r
7269 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
7271 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
\r
7272 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_show_banner &&
\r
7273 bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
\r
7274 char *banner = NULL;
\r
7276 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
\r
7278 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
\r
7282 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
\r
7283 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
\r
7285 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
\r
7287 unsigned int arg = 0;
\r
7288 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
\r
7289 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
\r
7290 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
\r
7292 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
\r
7295 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
\r
7298 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
\r
7299 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
\r
7303 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
\r
7305 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
\r
7306 struct Packet *pktin)
\r
7308 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
\r
7311 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
\r
7312 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
\r
7313 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
\r
7314 AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
\r
7315 AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI, /* always QUIET */
\r
7316 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
\r
7317 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
\r
7319 int done_service_req;
\r
7320 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
\r
7321 int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
\r
7326 int kbd_inter_refused;
\r
7327 int we_are_in, userauth_success;
\r
7328 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
\r
7330 char username[100];
\r
7333 void *publickey_blob;
\r
7334 int publickey_bloblen;
\r
7335 int publickey_encrypted;
\r
7336 char *publickey_algorithm;
\r
7337 char *publickey_comment;
\r
7338 unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
\r
7339 int agent_responselen;
\r
7340 unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
\r
7342 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
\r
7343 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
\r
7344 int siglen, retlen, len;
\r
7345 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
\r
7347 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
\r
7348 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
7350 struct ssh_gss_library *gsslib;
\r
7351 Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
\r
7352 Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
\r
7353 Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
\r
7354 Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
\r
7355 Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
\r
7358 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
\r
7360 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
\r
7362 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
\r
7363 s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = FALSE;
\r
7365 s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
\r
7368 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_userauth) {
\r
7370 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
\r
7372 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
\r
7373 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
\r
7374 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
7375 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
7376 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
\r
7377 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
\r
7379 if (!s->done_service_req) {
\r
7381 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
\r
7383 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
\r
7384 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
7385 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
7386 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
7387 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
\r
7388 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
\r
7390 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
\r
7395 /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
\r
7396 * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
\r
7397 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
\r
7398 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
\r
7399 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
\r
7402 * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
\r
7404 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
\r
7405 if (!s->we_are_in) {
\r
7408 * Load the public half of any configured public key file
\r
7411 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
\r
7413 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
\r
7414 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
\r
7415 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
\r
7416 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
\r
7417 const char *error;
\r
7418 s->publickey_blob =
\r
7419 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
\r
7420 &s->publickey_algorithm,
\r
7421 &s->publickey_bloblen,
\r
7422 &s->publickey_comment, &error);
\r
7423 if (s->publickey_blob) {
\r
7424 s->publickey_encrypted =
\r
7425 ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, NULL);
\r
7428 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
\r
7430 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
\r
7431 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
\r
7432 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
\r
7434 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
\r
7439 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
\r
7440 key_type_to_str(keytype));
\r
7441 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
\r
7443 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
\r
7444 key_type_to_str(keytype));
\r
7445 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
\r
7447 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
\r
7452 * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
\r
7453 * public key configured, filter out all others).
\r
7456 s->agent_response = NULL;
\r
7457 s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
\r
7458 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists()) {
\r
7462 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
\r
7464 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
\r
7465 PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
\r
7466 s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
\r
7467 if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
\r
7468 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
\r
7472 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
\r
7473 " waiting for agent response"));
\r
7476 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
7477 r = ssh->agent_response;
\r
7478 s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
\r
7480 s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
\r
7481 if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
\r
7482 s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
\r
7485 p = s->agent_response + 5;
\r
7486 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
\r
7488 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
\r
7489 if (s->publickey_blob) {
\r
7490 /* See if configured key is in agent. */
\r
7491 for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
\r
7492 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
\r
7493 if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
\r
7494 !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
\r
7495 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
\r
7496 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
\r
7497 "configured key file", keyi);
\r
7499 s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
\r
7502 p += 4 + s->pklen;
\r
7503 p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
\r
7505 if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
\r
7506 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
\r
7511 logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
\r
7518 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
\r
7519 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
\r
7520 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
\r
7521 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
\r
7522 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
\r
7523 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
\r
7525 * I think this best serves the needs of
\r
7527 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
\r
7528 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
\r
7529 * type both correctly
\r
7531 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
\r
7532 * need to fall back to passwords
\r
7534 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
\r
7535 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
\r
7536 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
\r
7537 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
\r
7538 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
\r
7541 s->username[0] = '\0';
\r
7542 s->got_username = FALSE;
\r
7543 while (!s->we_are_in) {
\r
7547 if (s->got_username && !ssh->cfg.change_username) {
\r
7549 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
\r
7550 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
\r
7553 } else if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
\r
7554 sizeof(s->username))) {
\r
7555 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
\r
7556 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
\r
7557 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
\r
7558 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
\r
7559 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
\r
7560 lenof(s->username));
\r
7561 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
\r
7564 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
\r
7565 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
\r
7570 * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
\r
7573 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
7574 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
\r
7577 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
\r
7578 lenof(s->username));
\r
7579 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
7582 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
\r
7583 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
\r
7584 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
\r
7588 s->got_username = TRUE;
\r
7591 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
\r
7592 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
\r
7593 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
\r
7595 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
\r
7597 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
7598 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
7599 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
\r
7600 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
\r
7601 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
7602 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
\r
7604 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
\r
7606 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
\r
7607 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
\r
7609 /* Reset agent request state. */
\r
7610 s->done_agent = FALSE;
\r
7611 if (s->agent_response) {
\r
7612 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
\r
7613 s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
\r
7615 s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
\r
7621 char *methods = NULL;
\r
7625 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
\r
7628 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
7630 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
\r
7631 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
\r
7632 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
\r
7636 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
\r
7638 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
\r
7639 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
\r
7640 * a script, which means nobody will read the
\r
7641 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
\r
7642 * the banner will screw up processing on the
\r
7643 * output of (say) plink.)
\r
7645 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
\r
7646 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
\r
7647 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
\r
7648 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
\r
7651 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
\r
7653 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
\r
7654 logevent("Access granted");
\r
7655 s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = TRUE;
\r
7659 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
\r
7660 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
\r
7661 "type %d", pktin->type));
\r
7668 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
\r
7669 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
\r
7670 * helpfully try next.
\r
7672 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
\r
7673 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
\r
7674 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
\r
7676 * We have received an unequivocal Access
\r
7677 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
\r
7678 * messages, or no message at all.
\r
7680 * For forms of authentication which are attempted
\r
7681 * implicitly, by which I mean without printing
\r
7682 * anything in the window indicating that we're
\r
7683 * trying them, we should never print 'Access
\r
7686 * If we do print a message saying that we're
\r
7687 * attempting some kind of authentication, it's OK
\r
7688 * to print a followup message saying it failed -
\r
7689 * but the message may sometimes be more specific
\r
7690 * than simply 'Access denied'.
\r
7692 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
\r
7693 * authentication, we should break out of this
\r
7694 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
\r
7695 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
\r
7696 * username change attempts).
\r
7698 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
\r
7700 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
\r
7701 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
\r
7702 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
\r
7703 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
\r
7704 logevent("Server refused our key");
\r
7705 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY) {
\r
7706 /* This _shouldn't_ happen except by a
\r
7707 * protocol bug causing client and server to
\r
7708 * disagree on what is a correct signature. */
\r
7709 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused public-key signature"
\r
7710 " despite accepting key!\r\n");
\r
7711 logevent("Server refused public-key signature"
\r
7712 " despite accepting key!");
\r
7713 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
\r
7714 /* quiet, so no c_write */
\r
7715 logevent("Server refused keyboard-interactive authentication");
\r
7716 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
\r
7717 /* always quiet, so no c_write */
\r
7718 /* also, the code down in the GSSAPI block has
\r
7719 * already logged this in the Event Log */
\r
7720 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE) {
\r
7721 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication failed");
\r
7722 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
\r
7724 assert(s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD);
\r
7725 logevent("Password authentication failed");
\r
7726 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
\r
7728 if (ssh->cfg.change_username) {
\r
7729 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
\r
7730 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
\r
7731 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
\r
7736 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
\r
7737 logevent("Further authentication required");
\r
7741 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
\r
7743 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
\r
7744 s->can_keyb_inter = ssh->cfg.try_ki_auth &&
\r
7745 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
\r
7747 if (!ssh->gsslibs)
\r
7748 ssh->gsslibs = ssh_gss_setup(&ssh->cfg);
\r
7749 s->can_gssapi = ssh->cfg.try_gssapi_auth &&
\r
7750 in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
\r
7751 ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries > 0;
\r
7755 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
\r
7757 if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
\r
7760 * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
\r
7763 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
\r
7765 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
\r
7767 /* Unpack key from agent response */
\r
7768 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
\r
7770 s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
\r
7771 s->agentp += s->pklen;
\r
7772 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
\r
7773 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
\r
7774 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
\r
7776 s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
\r
7777 s->agentp += s->commentlen;
\r
7778 /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
\r
7780 /* See if server will accept it */
\r
7781 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
7782 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
7783 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
7784 /* service requested */
\r
7785 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
\r
7787 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
\r
7788 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
7789 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
\r
7790 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
7791 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
\r
7792 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
7793 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
\r
7795 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
7796 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
\r
7798 /* Offer of key refused. */
\r
7805 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
\r
7806 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
\r
7808 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
\r
7809 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
\r
7813 * Server is willing to accept the key.
\r
7814 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
\r
7816 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
7817 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
7818 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
7819 /* service requested */
\r
7820 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
\r
7822 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
\r
7823 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
7824 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
\r
7825 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
7826 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
\r
7828 /* Ask agent for signature. */
\r
7829 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
\r
7830 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
\r
7831 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
\r
7833 s->len = 1; /* message type */
\r
7834 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
\r
7835 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
\r
7836 s->len += 4; /* flags */
\r
7837 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
\r
7838 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
\r
7839 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
\r
7840 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
\r
7841 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
\r
7843 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
\r
7845 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
\r
7847 /* Now the data to be signed... */
\r
7848 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
\r
7849 PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
\r
7852 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
\r
7853 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
\r
7854 s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
\r
7855 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
\r
7856 s->pktout->length - 5);
\r
7857 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
\r
7858 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
\r
7859 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
\r
7860 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
\r
7861 &vret, &s->retlen,
\r
7862 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
\r
7866 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
\r
7867 " while waiting for agent"
\r
7871 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
\r
7872 vret = ssh->agent_response;
\r
7873 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
\r
7876 sfree(s->agentreq);
\r
7878 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
\r
7879 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
\r
7880 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
\r
7881 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
\r
7883 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
\r
7884 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
7885 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
\r
7887 /* FIXME: less drastic response */
\r
7888 bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
\r
7894 /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
\r
7895 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
\r
7896 s->done_agent = TRUE;
\r
7897 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
\r
7900 if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
\r
7901 s->done_agent = TRUE;
\r
7904 } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
\r
7905 !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
\r
7907 struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
\r
7908 char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
\r
7910 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
\r
7912 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
\r
7915 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
\r
7917 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
\r
7918 * willing to accept it.
\r
7920 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
7921 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
7922 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
7923 /* service requested */
\r
7924 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
\r
7925 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
\r
7926 /* no signature included */
\r
7927 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
\r
7928 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
7929 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
\r
7930 (char *)s->publickey_blob,
\r
7931 s->publickey_bloblen);
\r
7932 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
7933 logevent("Offered public key");
\r
7935 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
7936 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
\r
7937 /* Key refused. Give up. */
\r
7938 s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
\r
7939 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
\r
7940 continue; /* process this new message */
\r
7942 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
\r
7945 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
\r
7948 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
\r
7949 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
\r
7950 c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
\r
7951 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
\r
7955 const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
\r
7956 if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
\r
7958 * Get a passphrase from the user.
\r
7960 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
\r
7961 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
\r
7962 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
\r
7963 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
\r
7964 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
\r
7965 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
\r
7966 s->publickey_comment),
\r
7967 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
7968 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
\r
7971 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
\r
7972 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
\r
7977 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
\r
7978 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
7979 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
\r
7980 "Unable to authenticate",
\r
7981 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
\r
7986 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
\r
7987 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
7989 passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
\r
7993 * Try decrypting the key.
\r
7995 key = ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, passphrase,
\r
7998 /* burn the evidence */
\r
7999 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
\r
8000 sfree(passphrase);
\r
8002 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
\r
8004 (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
\r
8005 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
\r
8007 /* and loop again */
\r
8009 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
\r
8010 c_write_str(ssh, error);
\r
8011 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
\r
8013 break; /* try something else */
\r
8019 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
\r
8020 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
\r
8024 * We have loaded the private key and the server
\r
8025 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
\r
8026 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
\r
8028 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
8029 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
8030 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
8031 /* service requested */
\r
8032 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
\r
8034 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
\r
8035 /* signature follows */
\r
8036 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
\r
8037 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
\r
8039 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
8040 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
\r
8044 * The data to be signed is:
\r
8046 * string session-id
\r
8048 * followed by everything so far placed in the
\r
8049 * outgoing packet.
\r
8051 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
\r
8052 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
\r
8053 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
\r
8055 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
\r
8057 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
\r
8058 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
\r
8061 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
\r
8062 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
\r
8063 p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
\r
8064 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
\r
8065 s->pktout->length - 5);
\r
8066 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
\r
8067 assert(p == sigdata_len);
\r
8068 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
\r
8069 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
\r
8070 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
\r
8071 sigblob, sigblob_len);
\r
8076 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8077 logevent("Sent public key signature");
\r
8078 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
\r
8079 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
\r
8083 } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
\r
8085 /* GSSAPI Authentication */
\r
8087 int micoffset, len;
\r
8090 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
\r
8091 s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
\r
8093 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
\r
8096 * Pick the highest GSS library on the preference
\r
8102 for (i = 0; i < ngsslibs; i++) {
\r
8103 int want_id = ssh->cfg.ssh_gsslist[i];
\r
8104 for (j = 0; j < ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries; j++)
\r
8105 if (ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j].id == want_id) {
\r
8106 s->gsslib = &ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j];
\r
8107 goto got_gsslib; /* double break */
\r
8112 * We always expect to have found something in
\r
8113 * the above loop: we only came here if there
\r
8114 * was at least one viable GSS library, and the
\r
8115 * preference list should always mention
\r
8116 * everything and only change the order.
\r
8118 assert(s->gsslib);
\r
8121 if (s->gsslib->gsslogmsg)
\r
8122 logevent(s->gsslib->gsslogmsg);
\r
8124 /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
\r
8125 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
8126 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
8127 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
8128 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
\r
8129 logevent("Attempting GSSAPI authentication");
\r
8131 /* add mechanism info */
\r
8132 s->gsslib->indicate_mech(s->gsslib, &s->gss_buf);
\r
8134 /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
\r
8135 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
\r
8137 /* length of OID + 2 */
\r
8138 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
\r
8139 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
\r
8141 /* length of OID */
\r
8142 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
\r
8144 ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
\r
8145 s->gss_buf.length);
\r
8146 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8147 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8148 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
\r
8149 logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
\r
8153 /* check returned packet ... */
\r
8155 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
\r
8156 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
\r
8157 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
\r
8158 if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
\r
8159 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
\r
8160 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
\r
8161 memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
\r
8162 s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
\r
8163 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
\r
8167 /* now start running */
\r
8168 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->import_name(s->gsslib,
\r
8169 ssh->fullhostname,
\r
8170 &s->gss_srv_name);
\r
8171 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
\r
8172 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
\r
8173 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
\r
8175 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
\r
8179 /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
\r
8180 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->acquire_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
\r
8182 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
\r
8183 logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
\r
8184 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
\r
8188 /* initial tokens are empty */
\r
8189 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
\r
8190 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
\r
8192 /* now enter the loop */
\r
8194 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->init_sec_context
\r
8198 ssh->cfg.gssapifwd,
\r
8202 if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
\r
8203 s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
\r
8204 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
\r
8206 if (s->gsslib->display_status(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx,
\r
8207 &s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
\r
8208 logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
\r
8209 sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
\r
8214 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
\r
8216 /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
\r
8217 * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
\r
8219 if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
\r
8220 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
\r
8221 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
8222 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
\r
8223 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8224 s->gsslib->free_tok(s->gsslib, &s->gss_sndtok);
\r
8227 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
\r
8228 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8229 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
\r
8230 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
\r
8231 s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
\r
8234 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
\r
8235 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
\r
8236 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
\r
8238 } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
\r
8240 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
\r
8241 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
\r
8242 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
\r
8245 logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
\r
8247 /* Now send the MIC */
\r
8249 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
\r
8250 micoffset = s->pktout->length;
\r
8251 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
8252 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
\r
8253 ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
8254 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
8255 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
8256 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
\r
8258 s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
\r
8259 s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
\r
8261 s->gsslib->get_mic(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
\r
8262 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
\r
8263 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
8264 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
\r
8265 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8266 s->gsslib->free_mic(s->gsslib, &mic);
\r
8270 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
\r
8271 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
\r
8274 } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
\r
8277 * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
\r
8280 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
\r
8282 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
\r
8284 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
8285 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
8286 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
8287 /* service requested */
\r
8288 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
\r
8290 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
\r
8291 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
\r
8292 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8294 logevent("Attempting keyboard-interactive authentication");
\r
8296 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8297 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
\r
8298 /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
\r
8299 * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
\r
8300 * user without actually issuing any prompts).
\r
8301 * Give up on it entirely. */
\r
8303 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
\r
8304 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
\r
8309 * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
\r
8311 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
\r
8313 char *name, *inst, *lang;
\r
8314 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
\r
8318 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
\r
8319 * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
\r
8321 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
\r
8322 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
\r
8323 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
\r
8324 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
\r
8325 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
\r
8328 * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
\r
8330 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
8331 for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
\r
8335 static char noprompt[] =
\r
8336 "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
\r
8338 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
\r
8339 echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
\r
8340 if (!prompt_len) {
\r
8341 prompt = noprompt;
\r
8342 prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
\r
8344 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
\r
8345 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
\r
8346 echo, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
8350 /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
\r
8351 * local prompts? */
\r
8352 s->cur_prompt->name =
\r
8353 dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
\r
8354 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
\r
8356 s->cur_prompt->name =
\r
8357 dupstr("SSH server authentication");
\r
8358 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
\r
8360 /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
\r
8361 * has come from the server.
\r
8362 * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
\r
8363 * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
\r
8364 /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
\r
8365 * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
\r
8366 * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
\r
8367 if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
\r
8368 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
\r
8369 dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
\r
8370 inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
\r
8371 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
\r
8373 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
\r
8377 * Display any instructions, and get the user's
\r
8381 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
\r
8382 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
\r
8385 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
\r
8386 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
\r
8391 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
\r
8393 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
8394 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
\r
8395 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
\r
8402 * Send the response(s) to the server.
\r
8404 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
\r
8405 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
\r
8406 for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
\r
8407 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
\r
8408 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
\r
8409 s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
\r
8410 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8412 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
\r
8415 * Free the prompts structure from this iteration.
\r
8416 * If there's another, a new one will be allocated
\r
8417 * when we return to the top of this while loop.
\r
8419 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
8422 * Get the next packet in case it's another
\r
8425 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8430 * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
\r
8434 } else if (s->can_passwd) {
\r
8437 * Plain old password authentication.
\r
8439 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
\r
8440 int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
\r
8442 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
\r
8444 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
\r
8445 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
\r
8446 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
\r
8447 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
\r
8450 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
8452 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
\r
8455 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
\r
8456 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
\r
8461 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
\r
8463 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
8464 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
\r
8465 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
\r
8470 * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
\r
8471 * asked to change it.)
\r
8473 s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
\r
8474 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
8477 * Send the password packet.
\r
8479 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
\r
8480 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
\r
8481 * user's password.
\r
8483 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
\r
8484 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
\r
8485 * people who find out how long their password is!
\r
8487 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
8488 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
8489 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
8490 /* service requested */
\r
8491 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
\r
8492 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
\r
8493 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
\r
8494 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
\r
8495 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8496 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
\r
8497 logevent("Sent password");
\r
8498 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
\r
8501 * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
\r
8504 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8505 changereq_first_time = TRUE;
\r
8507 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
\r
8510 * We're being asked for a new password
\r
8511 * (perhaps not for the first time).
\r
8512 * Loop until the server accepts it.
\r
8515 int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
\r
8516 char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
\r
8517 int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
\r
8521 if (changereq_first_time)
\r
8522 msg = "Server requested password change";
\r
8524 msg = "Server rejected new password";
\r
8526 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
\r
8527 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
\r
8530 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
\r
8532 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
\r
8533 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
\r
8534 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
\r
8535 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
\r
8536 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
\r
8537 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
\r
8539 * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
\r
8540 * for the "old" passwords in the original and
\r
8541 * password-change messages to be the same, and
\r
8542 * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
\r
8543 * by the user entering a blank password originally
\r
8544 * and the real password subsequently, so,
\r
8545 * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
\r
8547 * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
\r
8548 * to check this field.)
\r
8550 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
\r
8551 dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
\r
8552 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
8553 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
\r
8554 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
8555 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
\r
8556 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
\r
8559 * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
\r
8562 while (!got_new) {
\r
8564 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
\r
8567 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
\r
8568 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
\r
8573 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
\r
8575 /* burn the evidence */
\r
8576 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
8577 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
\r
8578 sfree(s->password);
\r
8579 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
\r
8580 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
\r
8586 * If the user specified a new original password
\r
8587 * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
\r
8589 * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
\r
8590 * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
\r
8592 if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
\r
8593 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
\r
8594 /* burn the evidence */
\r
8595 sfree(s->password);
\r
8597 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
\r
8601 * Check the two new passwords match.
\r
8603 got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
\r
8604 s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
\r
8607 /* They don't. Silly user. */
\r
8608 c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
\r
8613 * Send the new password (along with the old one).
\r
8614 * (see above for padding rationale)
\r
8616 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
\r
8617 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
\r
8618 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
\r
8619 /* service requested */
\r
8620 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
\r
8621 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
\r
8622 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
\r
8623 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
\r
8624 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
\r
8625 s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
\r
8626 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
\r
8627 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8628 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
\r
8629 logevent("Sent new password");
\r
8632 * Now see what the server has to say about it.
\r
8633 * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
\r
8636 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8637 changereq_first_time = FALSE;
\r
8642 * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
\r
8643 * of the loop. Either:
\r
8644 * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
\r
8645 * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
\r
8647 * - we sent a new password, and the server was
\r
8648 * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
\r
8649 * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
\r
8650 * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
\r
8651 * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
\r
8652 * the loop and start again.
\r
8657 * We don't need the old password any more, in any
\r
8658 * case. Burn the evidence.
\r
8660 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
\r
8661 sfree(s->password);
\r
8664 char *str = dupprintf("No supported authentication methods available"
\r
8665 " (server sent: %.*s)",
\r
8666 methlen, methods);
\r
8668 ssh_disconnect(ssh, str,
\r
8669 "No supported authentication methods available",
\r
8670 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
\r
8680 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
\r
8682 /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
\r
8683 if (s->publickey_blob) {
\r
8684 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
\r
8685 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
\r
8687 if (s->agent_response)
\r
8688 sfree(s->agent_response);
\r
8690 if (s->userauth_success) {
\r
8692 * We've just received USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and we haven't sent any
\r
8693 * packets since. Signal the transport layer to consider enacting
\r
8694 * delayed compression.
\r
8696 * (Relying on we_are_in is not sufficient, as
\r
8697 * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed is quite clear that it
\r
8698 * triggers on USERAUTH_SUCCESS specifically, and we_are_in can
\r
8699 * become set for other reasons.)
\r
8701 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "enabling delayed compression", -2, NULL);
\r
8705 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
\r
8708 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
\r
8711 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
\r
8712 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
\r
8714 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
\r
8715 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
\r
8716 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
\r
8717 ssh2_msg_global_request;
\r
8720 * Create the main session channel.
\r
8722 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell) {
\r
8723 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
\r
8724 } else if (*ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host) {
\r
8726 * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
\r
8729 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
\r
8730 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
\r
8731 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
\r
8733 "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
\r
8734 ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
\r
8735 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
\r
8736 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
\r
8737 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
\r
8738 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
\r
8739 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
\r
8740 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host);
\r
8741 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
\r
8743 * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
\r
8744 * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
\r
8747 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
\r
8748 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
\r
8749 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8751 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8752 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
\r
8753 bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
\r
8755 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
\r
8757 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
\r
8758 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
\r
8761 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
8762 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
\r
8763 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
\r
8764 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
8765 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
8766 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
\r
8767 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
\r
8768 logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
\r
8769 ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
\r
8771 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
\r
8772 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
\r
8773 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
\r
8774 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
\r
8775 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
\r
8776 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
\r
8777 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
\r
8778 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
\r
8779 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8780 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8781 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
\r
8782 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
\r
8784 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
\r
8786 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
\r
8787 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
\r
8790 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
8791 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
\r
8792 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
\r
8793 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
8794 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
8795 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
\r
8796 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
\r
8797 logevent("Opened channel for session");
\r
8798 ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
\r
8802 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
\r
8803 * general channel-based messages.
\r
8805 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
\r
8806 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
\r
8807 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
\r
8808 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
\r
8809 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
\r
8810 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
\r
8811 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
\r
8812 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
\r
8813 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
\r
8814 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
\r
8815 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
\r
8816 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
\r
8817 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
\r
8819 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->cfg.ssh_simple) {
\r
8821 * This message indicates to the server that we promise
\r
8822 * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
\r
8823 * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
\r
8824 * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
\r
8826 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
8827 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
\r
8828 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
\r
8829 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* no reply */
\r
8830 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8834 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
\r
8836 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
\r
8837 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
\r
8838 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
\r
8839 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
\r
8840 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
8841 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
\r
8842 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
\r
8843 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
\r
8844 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
\r
8845 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
\r
8847 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
\r
8848 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
\r
8849 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
\r
8850 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
\r
8851 * cookie into the log.
\r
8853 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
\r
8854 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
\r
8855 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8856 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
\r
8857 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8859 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8861 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
\r
8862 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
\r
8863 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
\r
8864 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
\r
8867 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
\r
8869 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
\r
8870 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
\r
8875 * Enable port forwardings.
\r
8877 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
\r
8880 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
\r
8882 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
\r
8883 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
\r
8884 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
8885 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
\r
8886 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
\r
8887 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
\r
8888 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8890 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8892 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
\r
8893 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
\r
8894 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
\r
8895 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
\r
8898 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
\r
8900 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
\r
8901 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
\r
8906 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
\r
8908 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !ssh->cfg.nopty) {
\r
8909 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
\r
8910 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
\r
8911 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
\r
8912 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
\r
8913 /* Build the pty request. */
\r
8914 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
8915 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
\r
8916 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
\r
8917 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
\r
8918 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.termtype);
\r
8919 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
\r
8920 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
\r
8921 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
\r
8922 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
\r
8923 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
8924 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
\r
8925 ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
\r
8926 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
\r
8927 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
\r
8928 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
\r
8929 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
\r
8930 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
\r
8931 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8932 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
\r
8934 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8936 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
\r
8937 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
\r
8938 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
\r
8939 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
\r
8942 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
\r
8943 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
\r
8945 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
\r
8946 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
\r
8949 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
\r
8953 * Send environment variables.
\r
8955 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
\r
8956 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
\r
8958 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && *ssh->cfg.environmt) {
\r
8959 char *e = ssh->cfg.environmt;
\r
8960 char *var, *varend, *val;
\r
8966 while (*e && *e != '\t') e++;
\r
8968 if (*e == '\t') e++;
\r
8973 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
8974 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
\r
8975 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
\r
8976 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
\r
8977 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
\r
8978 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, var, varend-var);
\r
8979 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
\r
8980 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
8985 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
\r
8988 s->env_left = s->num_env;
\r
8990 while (s->env_left > 0) {
\r
8991 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
8993 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
\r
8994 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
\r
8995 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
\r
8996 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
\r
9006 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
\r
9007 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
\r
9008 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
\r
9009 logevent("All environment variables refused");
\r
9010 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
\r
9012 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
\r
9013 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
\r
9014 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
\r
9019 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
\r
9020 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
\r
9023 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
\r
9027 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
\r
9028 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys2;
\r
9029 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
\r
9031 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys;
\r
9032 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
\r
9033 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
\r
9036 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
9037 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
\r
9039 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
\r
9040 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
\r
9041 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
\r
9042 } else if (*cmd) {
\r
9043 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
\r
9044 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
\r
9045 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
\r
9047 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
\r
9048 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
\r
9050 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
\r
9052 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
\r
9054 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
\r
9055 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
\r
9056 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
\r
9057 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
\r
9061 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
\r
9062 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
\r
9063 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
\r
9064 * back to it before complaining.
\r
9066 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 != NULL) {
\r
9067 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
\r
9068 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
\r
9071 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
\r
9074 logevent("Started a shell/command");
\r
9079 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
\r
9080 if (ssh->size_needed)
\r
9081 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
\r
9082 if (ssh->eof_needed)
\r
9083 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
\r
9086 * All the initial channel requests are done, so install the default
\r
9087 * failure handler.
\r
9089 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_success;
\r
9090 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_failure;
\r
9096 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
\r
9097 if (ssh->mainchan)
\r
9101 s->try_send = FALSE;
\r
9105 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
\r
9106 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
\r
9107 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
\r
9110 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
\r
9112 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
\r
9114 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
\r
9116 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
\r
9117 s->try_send = TRUE;
\r
9119 if (s->try_send) {
\r
9121 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
9123 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
\r
9125 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
\r
9126 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
\r
9134 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
\r
9136 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
9138 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
\r
9140 int reason, msglen;
\r
9142 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
\r
9143 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
\r
9145 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
\r
9146 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
\r
9147 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
\r
9149 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
\r
9150 " type %d)", reason);
\r
9154 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
\r
9157 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
\r
9159 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
\r
9160 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
\r
9165 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
9167 /* log the debug message */
\r
9171 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of the return value */
\r
9172 ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
\r
9173 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
\r
9175 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
\r
9178 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
\r
9180 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
9181 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
\r
9182 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
\r
9184 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
\r
9185 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
\r
9187 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
\r
9191 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
\r
9193 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
\r
9198 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
\r
9200 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
\r
9201 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
\r
9204 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
\r
9205 * the coroutines will get it.
\r
9207 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
\r
9208 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
\r
9209 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
\r
9210 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
\r
9211 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
\r
9212 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
\r
9213 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
\r
9214 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
\r
9215 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
\r
9216 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
\r
9217 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
\r
9218 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
\r
9219 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
\r
9220 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
\r
9221 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
\r
9222 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
\r
9223 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
\r
9224 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
\r
9225 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
\r
9226 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
\r
9227 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
\r
9228 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
\r
9229 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
\r
9230 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
\r
9231 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
\r
9232 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
\r
9233 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
\r
9234 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
\r
9235 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
\r
9236 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
\r
9237 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
\r
9238 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
\r
9239 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
\r
9242 * These special message types we install handlers for.
\r
9244 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
\r
9245 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
\r
9246 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
\r
9249 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
\r
9251 Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
\r
9253 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
\r
9256 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0 &&
\r
9257 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
\r
9258 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
\r
9262 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
\r
9263 struct Packet *pktin)
\r
9265 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
\r
9266 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
\r
9270 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
\r
9271 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
\r
9272 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
\r
9273 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
\r
9274 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
\r
9277 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
\r
9278 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
\r
9282 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
\r
9283 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
\r
9284 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
\r
9285 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
\r
9286 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
\r
9288 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
\r
9290 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
\r
9293 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
\r
9298 * Called to set up the connection.
\r
9300 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
\r
9302 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
\r
9304 char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
\r
9310 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
\r
9311 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
\r
9312 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
\r
9314 ssh->cipher = NULL;
\r
9315 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
\r
9316 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
\r
9317 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
\r
9318 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
\r
9319 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
\r
9320 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
\r
9321 ssh->csmac = NULL;
\r
9322 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
\r
9323 ssh->scmac = NULL;
\r
9324 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
\r
9325 ssh->cscomp = NULL;
\r
9326 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
\r
9327 ssh->sccomp = NULL;
\r
9328 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
\r
9330 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
\r
9331 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
\r
9332 ssh->exitcode = -1;
\r
9333 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
\r
9334 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
\r
9335 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
\r
9336 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
\r
9337 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
\r
9338 ssh->ldisc = NULL;
\r
9339 ssh->logctx = NULL;
\r
9340 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
\r
9341 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
\r
9342 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
\r
9343 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
\r
9344 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
\r
9345 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
\r
9346 ssh->x11disp = NULL;
\r
9347 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
\r
9348 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
\r
9349 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
\r
9350 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
\r
9351 ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
\r
9352 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
\r
9353 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
\r
9354 ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
\r
9355 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
\r
9356 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
\r
9357 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
\r
9358 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
\r
9359 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
\r
9360 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
\r
9363 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
\r
9364 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
\r
9365 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
\r
9366 ssh->queue = NULL;
\r
9367 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
\r
9368 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
\r
9369 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
\r
9370 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
\r
9371 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
\r
9372 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
\r
9374 *backend_handle = ssh;
\r
9376 #ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
\r
9377 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
\r
9378 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
\r
9381 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
\r
9382 ssh->term_width = ssh->cfg.width;
\r
9383 ssh->term_height = ssh->cfg.height;
\r
9385 ssh->channels = NULL;
\r
9386 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
\r
9387 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
\r
9392 ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
\r
9393 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
\r
9394 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
\r
9396 ssh->protocol = NULL;
\r
9398 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
\r
9400 ssh->pinger = NULL;
\r
9402 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
\r
9403 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
\r
9404 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_data);
\r
9405 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
\r
9408 ssh->gsslibs = NULL;
\r
9411 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
\r
9420 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
\r
9422 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9423 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
9424 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
\r
9426 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
\r
9427 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
\r
9428 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
\r
9429 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
\r
9430 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
\r
9431 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
\r
9432 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
\r
9433 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
\r
9434 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
\r
9435 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
\r
9436 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
\r
9438 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
\r
9440 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
\r
9442 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
\r
9444 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
\r
9446 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
\r
9449 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
\r
9450 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
\r
9452 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
\r
9453 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
\r
9454 sfree(ssh->queue);
\r
9456 while (ssh->qhead) {
\r
9457 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
\r
9458 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
\r
9459 sfree(ssh->qhead);
\r
9461 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
\r
9463 if (ssh->channels) {
\r
9464 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
\r
9465 switch (c->type) {
\r
9467 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
\r
9468 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
\r
9470 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
\r
9471 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
\r
9472 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
\r
9473 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
\r
9478 freetree234(ssh->channels);
\r
9479 ssh->channels = NULL;
\r
9482 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
\r
9483 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
\r
9484 free_rportfwd(pf);
\r
9485 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
\r
9486 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
\r
9488 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
\r
9490 x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
\r
9491 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
\r
9492 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
\r
9493 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
\r
9494 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
\r
9497 sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
\r
9498 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
\r
9499 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
\r
9500 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
\r
9503 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
\r
9504 expire_timer_context(ssh);
\r
9506 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
\r
9507 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
\r
9510 ssh_gss_cleanup(ssh->gsslibs);
\r
9518 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
\r
9520 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
\r
9522 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9523 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
\r
9524 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
\r
9526 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, &ssh->cfg, cfg);
\r
9527 if (ssh->portfwds)
\r
9528 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, cfg);
\r
9530 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != cfg->ssh_rekey_time &&
\r
9531 cfg->ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
\r
9532 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + cfg->ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
\r
9533 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
\r
9535 if (new_next - now < 0) {
\r
9536 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
\r
9538 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
\r
9542 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
\r
9543 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
\r
9544 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
\r
9545 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
\r
9546 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
\r
9547 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
\r
9548 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
\r
9551 if (ssh->cfg.compression != cfg->compression) {
\r
9552 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
\r
9553 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
\r
9556 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc != cfg->ssh2_des_cbc ||
\r
9557 memcmp(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist, cfg->ssh_cipherlist,
\r
9558 sizeof(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist))) {
\r
9559 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
\r
9560 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
\r
9563 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
\r
9566 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
\r
9567 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
\r
9568 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
\r
9569 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
\r
9575 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
\r
9577 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
\r
9579 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9581 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
\r
9584 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
\r
9586 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
\r
9590 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
\r
9592 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
\r
9594 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9595 int override_value;
\r
9597 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
\r
9601 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
\r
9602 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
\r
9604 override_value = 0;
\r
9605 if (ssh->throttled_all)
\r
9606 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
\r
9608 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
9609 return override_value;
\r
9610 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
\r
9611 if (!ssh->mainchan || ssh->mainchan->closes > 0)
\r
9612 return override_value;
\r
9614 return (override_value +
\r
9615 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
\r
9622 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
\r
9624 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
\r
9626 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9627 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
9629 ssh->term_width = width;
\r
9630 ssh->term_height = height;
\r
9632 switch (ssh->state) {
\r
9633 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
\r
9634 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
\r
9635 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
\r
9636 break; /* do nothing */
\r
9637 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
\r
9638 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
\r
9640 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
\r
9641 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
\r
9642 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
9643 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
\r
9644 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
\r
9645 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
\r
9646 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
\r
9647 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
\r
9648 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
9649 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
\r
9650 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
\r
9651 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
\r
9652 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
\r
9653 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
\r
9654 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
\r
9655 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
\r
9656 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
9664 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
\r
9667 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
\r
9669 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
\r
9670 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
\r
9672 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_ignore_special[] = {
\r
9673 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
\r
9675 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_rekey_special[] = {
\r
9676 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
\r
9678 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
\r
9680 {"Break", TS_BRK},
\r
9681 /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
\r
9682 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
\r
9683 * required signals. */
\r
9684 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
\r
9685 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
\r
9686 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
\r
9687 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
\r
9688 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
\r
9689 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
\r
9690 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
\r
9691 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
\r
9692 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
\r
9693 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
\r
9694 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
\r
9696 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
\r
9697 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
\r
9699 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
\r
9700 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_ignore_special) +
\r
9701 lenof(ssh2_rekey_special) +
\r
9702 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
\r
9703 lenof(specials_end)];
\r
9704 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9706 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
\r
9708 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
\r
9709 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
\r
9710 i += lenof(name); \
\r
9713 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
9714 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
\r
9715 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
\r
9716 * asked anyway. */
\r
9717 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
\r
9718 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
\r
9719 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
\r
9720 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE))
\r
9721 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_ignore_special);
\r
9722 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY))
\r
9723 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_rekey_special);
\r
9724 if (ssh->mainchan)
\r
9725 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
\r
9726 } /* else we're not ready yet */
\r
9729 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
\r
9730 return ssh_specials;
\r
9734 #undef ADD_SPECIALS
\r
9738 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
\r
9739 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
\r
9740 * hostname sort').
\r
9742 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
\r
9744 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9745 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
9747 if (code == TS_EOF) {
\r
9748 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
\r
9750 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
\r
9751 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
\r
9753 if (code == TS_EOF)
\r
9754 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
\r
9757 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
9758 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
\r
9759 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
\r
9760 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
\r
9761 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
\r
9762 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
9763 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
\r
9765 logevent("Sent EOF message");
\r
9766 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
\r
9767 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
\r
9768 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
\r
9769 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
9770 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
\r
9771 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
\r
9773 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
\r
9774 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
\r
9775 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
\r
9776 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
\r
9779 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
\r
9780 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
\r
9781 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
\r
9783 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
\r
9784 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
\r
9785 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
\r
9786 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
9787 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
\r
9788 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
\r
9789 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
9790 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
\r
9791 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
\r
9792 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
\r
9793 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
\r
9794 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
9797 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
\r
9798 char *signame = NULL;
\r
9799 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
\r
9800 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
\r
9801 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
\r
9802 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
\r
9803 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
\r
9804 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
\r
9805 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
\r
9806 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
\r
9807 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
\r
9808 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
\r
9809 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
\r
9810 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
\r
9811 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
\r
9812 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
\r
9813 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
\r
9815 /* It's a signal. */
\r
9816 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
\r
9817 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
\r
9818 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
\r
9819 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
\r
9820 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
\r
9821 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
\r
9822 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
9823 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
\r
9826 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
\r
9831 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
\r
9833 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9834 struct ssh_channel *c;
\r
9835 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
\r
9838 ssh2_channel_init(c);
\r
9839 c->halfopen = TRUE;
\r
9840 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
\r
9842 add234(ssh->channels, c);
\r
9847 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
\r
9848 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
\r
9850 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
\r
9852 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9855 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
9856 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
\r
9857 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
\r
9858 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
\r
9861 if (ssh->mainchan) {
\r
9862 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
\r
9863 bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
\r
9864 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
\r
9865 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple)
\r
9868 buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
\r
9869 if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
\r
9870 ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
\r
9871 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
\r
9877 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
\r
9879 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
\r
9881 struct Packet *pktout;
\r
9883 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
\r
9885 if (ssh->version == 1) {
\r
9886 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
\r
9887 PKT_INT, c->localid,
\r
9888 PKT_STR, hostname,
\r
9890 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
\r
9893 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
\r
9894 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
\r
9895 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
\r
9896 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
\r
9897 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
\r
9898 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
\r
9899 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
\r
9901 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
\r
9902 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
\r
9903 * convinced the server should be told details like that
\r
9904 * about my local network configuration.
\r
9905 * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
\r
9906 * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
\r
9907 * if it doesn't match this syntax.
\r
9909 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
\r
9910 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
\r
9911 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
\r
9915 static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
\r
9917 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9918 return ssh->s != NULL;
\r
9921 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
\r
9923 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9924 return ssh->send_ok;
\r
9927 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
\r
9929 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9930 if (option == LD_ECHO)
\r
9931 return ssh->echoing;
\r
9932 if (option == LD_EDIT)
\r
9933 return ssh->editing;
\r
9937 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
\r
9939 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9940 ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
\r
9943 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
\r
9945 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9946 ssh->logctx = logctx;
\r
9949 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
\r
9951 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9952 if (ssh->s != NULL)
\r
9955 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
\r
9959 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
\r
9960 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
\r
9962 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
\r
9964 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9965 return ssh->version;
\r
9969 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
\r
9970 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
\r
9971 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
\r
9973 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
\r
9975 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
\r
9976 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
\r
9979 Backend ssh_backend = {
\r
9989 ssh_return_exitcode,
\r
9992 ssh_provide_ldisc,
\r
9993 ssh_provide_logctx,
\r
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